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ABSTRACT 
 As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to evolve with ever-increasing speed, 
especially in the commercial sector, the military community runs the risk of being left 
behind. This is especially problematic for Special Operations Forces (SOF) worldwide, as 
they are often the first to encounter new methods and technology employed by irregular 
adversaries. By studying contemporary research and interviewing experts within the field 
of AI, the authors employ a mixed-methods approach to explore what factors the SOF 
community must consider when acquiring and evaluating new AI capabilities. 
Furthermore, the authors attempt to clarify what qualifies as AI and what  factors affect 
its adoption and user acceptance. The results of this study suggest that to avoid or 
minimize the traps associated with AI, the military must partner with other organizations, 
focusing on the right products and managing the education and expectations of the users 
within their organization. Rather than recommend specific products or solutions, this 
capstone report proposes a tentative model focused on risk mitigation and fast 
procurement chains to allow SOF to maintain its edge on the current battlefield. 
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As current developments in artificial intelligence (AI) rapidly move forward, 
several implementations are emerging that promise enhancements to both the conduct of 
military operations as well as the functions within organizations. Nevertheless, since AI 
research is both expensive and often driven by the civilian sector, and thereby general 
public demand, the edge in research and development is mainly confined to large and 
economically strong nations such as China and the United States.1 As special operations 
forces (SOF) often are at the forefront of implementing new technology within nations’ 
militaries, the issue of identifying trends, as well as adapting the organization to 
accommodate new technologies, is highly relevant within the SOF community. To achieve 
and maintain an acceptable level of implementation and utilization of emerging 
technologies, SOF must understand the problems connected to implementing AI with its 
organization in order to determine which technologies and capabilities to pursue. By 
examining the different approaches other organizations have taken to implement AI, as 
well as trying to identify future capabilities predicted by both the civilian sector and 
academia, this capstone explores a way forward for the SOF community for acquiring AI. 
Hence, the question to be answered is: What factors must the SOF community consider 
when acquiring and evaluating new AI capabilities? 
A. STRUCTURE 
Initially, a context for the capstone is presented by looking at what AI is, and what 
AI promises to be, followed by an explanation of the methodology used throughout the 
research. The subsequent analysis is based on previous research regarding military 
acquisition of AI and identified problem sets. As the results of the analysis are presented, 
this capstone produces guidelines for the SOF community and suggests a SOF-specific 
model on how to evaluate and assess the utility of AI implementation. The conclusion is 
 
1 Lee, Kai-Fu, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 168. 
 
2 
that the SOF community is well suited to gain the edge in the AI race provided the 
limitations of being a small organization are accepted and AI-specific pitfalls are mitigated. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
Within the framework of this capstone, the following definitions are used 
throughout the research. Further detail on the history and a literature review of AI and 
foundational knowledge regarding the subject of data is presented in Appendix A. 
Artificial Intelligence is, as further discussed in Appendix A – History of AI, a 
highly contested subject. While some scholars argue that everything that can produce a 
calculation and reach a result void of human interaction constitutes as AI, others reject this 
notion and argue that only a machine that can adapt to context, learn new tasks, and 
function as a human should be considered intelligent.2 Therefore, the following analysis 
focuses on Machine Learning (ML), something that most scholars agree to be AI.3 Jason 
Bell, the author of the book Machine Learning: Hands-On for Developers and Technical 
Professionals, defines ML as: 
Machine learning is a branch of artificial intelligence. Using computing, we 
design systems that can learn from data in a manner of being trained. The 
systems might learn and improve with experience, and with time, refine a 
model that can be used to predict outcomes of questions based on the 
previous learning.4 
While ML consists of several sub-divisions, such as assisted learning, unassisted 
learning, and deep learning, all ML is based on the use of data to learn new traits.5 
 
2 Kelley M. Sayler, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, CRS Report R45178 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 1–2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf.  
3 Rafay Chaudhary, “Artificial Intelligence: More than Machine Learning,” Towards Data Science, 
September 2019, https://towardsdatascience.com/artificial-intelligence-more-than-machine-learning-
fc95a1f8c2f5.  
4 Jason Bell, Machine Learning: Hands-On for Developers and Technical Professionals (Indianapolis, 
IN: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 2, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=1818248.  
5 Yang Xin et al., “Machine Learning and Deep Learning Methods for Cybersecurity,” IEEE Access 6 
(May 2018): 35367, https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2836950.  
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Confidentiality, Integrity, and Accessibility (CIA) is a well-known triad of 
cybersecurity.6 The CIA triad, which describes the need for protection of data while still 
allowing access for authorized users, emerged as a measure for cybersecurity in the early 
1980s.7 Since then, the abbreviation has developed into the main parameters for measuring 
the security of a network, especially within the military.8 
Strategy is often described as the effort to balance ways (how) and means (what) to 
achieve reachable ends (goals) while considering risks (threats).9 In his article “Defining 
Military Strategy,” Arthur Lykke described the relationship of ends, ways, and means as a 
three-legged stool used to counter the risks of a nation.10 Using the analogy of the stool, 
Lykke argued that disproportion among the ends, means, and ways results in an unstable 
strategy to counter the risks.11 Although the main purpose of this capstone is not to produce 
a strategy for AI, the ends, ways, and means construct provides the structure to suggest 
best practices to deflect the risks of implementing AI in a military setting. 
  
 
6 Mehul S. Raval, Ratnik Gandhi, and Sanjay Chaudhary, “Insider Threat Detection: Machine 
Learning Way,” in Versatile Cybersecurity, ed. Mauro Conti, Gaurav Somani, and Radha Poovendran, 
Advances in Information Security (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 204, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97643-3_2.  
7 Spyridon Samonas and David Coss, “The CIA Strikes Back: Redefining Confidentiality, Integrity 
And Availability In Security,” Journal of Information System Security 10, no. 3 (2014): 21–22, 
http://www.proso.com/dl/Samonas.pdf.  
8 Samonas and Coss, 25. 
9 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking,” Naval War College 
Review 60, no. 4, Article 10. (2007): 112, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss4/10.  
10 Arthur F. Lykke, “Defining Military Strategy,” Military Review 77, no. 1 (February 1997): 183–85, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/225319163/abstract/B68261794C094016PQ/1. 
11 Lykke, 184. 
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II. THE PROMISE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
As new technologies emerge, there is often a sense that they will alter the world 
entirely, as was the case with the harnessing of electricity, the innovation of flight, and the 
completion of the nuclear bomb. Although these technologies have certainly changed the 
world as we know it in one way or another, however, the rate of change has seemingly 
always depended on society’s ability to absorb and distribute change. Only the atom bomb 
can be said to have created a sudden and instant change in society.12 Furthermore, all of 
these technologies have yet to achieve some of their purported impact; electricity has not 
yet eradicated fossil fuels as the primary source of propulsion, flight has yet to allow for 
mass travel around the world at supersonic speed, and much less did the advent of the 
atomic bomb provide the means to end to all wars.13 Still, most scholars agree that AI 
promises change within several areas, such as world economics, transportation, and 
military capabilities in the near future.14 Perhaps AI will prove the odd one out by radically 
and forever upsetting society within a matter of years in what some call an “AI 
revolution.”15 Nonetheless, even though AI promises a future where machines not only 
replace humans performing menial jobs, but also threaten even the fabric underpinning 
corporate culture and the world economy, there are reasons to be skeptical.16 AI research 
 
12 Robert A. Buchanan, “History of Technology, WWII, The Japanese Surrender,” Britannica, 
Technology, November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II/Hiroshima-and-Nagasaki. 
13 George Orwell, “You and the Atom Bomb,” The Orwell Foundation, April 2,2020, 
https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/you-and-the-
atom-bomb/. 
14 Michael C. Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Artificial 
Intelligence and International Security (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, July 2018), 
7; Katja Grace et al., “Viewpoint: When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts,” 
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 62 (July 31, 2018): 729, https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11222; 
Joseph Byrum, “Taking Advantage of the AI Revolution,” ISE; Industrial and Systems Engineering at 
Work 50, no. 6 (June 2018): 29, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/2054133919/abstract/27A128515D48480DPQ/1; Lee, AI Superpowers, 
144. 
15 Byrum, “Taking Advantage of the AI Revolution,” 29. 
16 Byrum, 32. 
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and implementation has in fact already affected society during the last seventy years.17 
Furthermore, similar forecasts of displacement of labor were made as early as the 1980s 
by several scholars looking into the possibilities of AI.18 It, therefore, seems hard to say 
that the “revolution” suddenly will upset the current way of life.  
Just as most innovations plateau when they are at their most promising height, AI 
has also suffered from “AI Winters,” as several scholars point out.19 Furthermore, the 
widespread adoption of almost all inventions is reliant on customer demand and 
profitability, rather than on pure possibility and actual benefits to society.20 With the 
construction of the Concorde, for example, the engineers were looking into accessing 
supersonic speeds for commercial travel. Uniting visions and promising a revolution in 
commercial flight, the prospect of traversing the globe in mere hours led countries and 
companies to pour significant funding into the project. In the end, this turned out to be a 
non-profitable market, resulting in the abandonment of the Concord in 2003.21 At the 
moment, there is a sense of the same evolution facing AI; the mere promise of possibilities 
seems to have sparked a self-revolving revolution in AI. In fear of missing out and lagging 
behind the competition, government procurement organizations seem interested in almost 
anything labeled “AI.” 
 
17 John Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, 1st paperback ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1989), 176, https://ieeexplore-ieee-
org.libproxy.nps.edu/xpl/ebooks/bookPdfWithBanner.jsp?fileName=6302870.pdf&bkn=6276821&pdfTyp
e=chapter.  
18 Robert Trappl, ed., Impacts of Artificial Intelligence: Scientific, Technological, Military, Economic, 
Societal, Cultural, and Political, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1986), 39–42. 
19 James Hendler, “Avoiding Another AI Winter,” IEEE Intelligent Systems 23, no. 2 (March 2008): 
2, https://doi.org/10.1109/MIS.2008.20 ; Andreas Holzinger et al., “Current Advances, Trends and 
Challenges of Machine Learning and Knowledge Extraction: From Machine Learning to Explainable AI,” 
in Machine Learning and Knowledge Extraction, ed. Andreas Holzinger et al., vol. 11015 (Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99740-7_1; 
Lee, AI Superpowers, 6–8. 
20 Bhaskar Chakravorti, “The New Rules for Bringing Innovations to Market,” Harvard Business 
Review, 2004, 5. 
21 Florian Ion Tiberiu Petrescu and Relly Victoria Petrescu, The Aviation History. (Norderstedt, 
Germany: Books on Demand GmbH, 2012), 40–41, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1273.9285.  
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As Kai-Fu Lee, an acknowledged expert within the field of AI points out, society 
will continue to dilute the effect of inventions, which require new infrastructure, 
regulations, and norms that are time consuming and expensive to establish.22 Driverless 
cars are one current example, promising safer transportation by eliminating the human 
factor.23 As humans are reluctant to put their lives in the hands of pure automation, 
however, there is little evidence that the public would allow the total automation of all cars 
within the next few years.24  This does not mean that driverless vehicles are utopic (they 
already exist in small numbers); instead, it suggests that it takes time for humans to accept 
and get accustomed to new inventions. 
Considering the inherent inertia in society to swiftly adopt changes, militaries, as 
well as society, should therefore be cautious of products promising swift solutions for 
everything. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the advancements in AI should, or can, 
be neglected.25 Instead, a more sensible approach for assessing new capabilities in AI 
might be one that considers the inertia of adaptation to new technology produced by 
legislation, culture, and resistance to change within organizations.26 After all, AI will 
undoubtedly have some effect on both economic growth and military capabilities, as well 
as how society functions as a whole, as agreed by most scholars.  
A. AI AND THE MILITARY 
From a military perspective, the utility of AI promises not only smarter and better 
decisions at a lower cost but also new possibilities of facing the enemy at a lesser risk to 
 
22 Lee, AI Superpowers, 164. 
23 Lee, 101. 
24 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 164–65. 
25 Byrum, “Taking Advantage of the AI Revolution,” 31. 
26 Lee, AI Superpowers, 142–142. 
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human life.27 In a society highly concerned with price and human welfare, this has sparked 
the race to be at the forefront of AI technology. This race has provided ample opportunities 
for AI researchers around the globe to present their products to the military.28 In response 
to Chinese advances in the field, the U.S. Army has commissioned several Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) projects worth billions in revenues to 
exploit the new gains AI offers in processing big data.29 The United States, supported by 
well-functioning academia, has so far maintained its advantage in the race by adopting a 
careful approach, where big companies such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft have been 
allowed to dominate the market.30 Yet, while the U.S. approach from the government has 
focused on restricting the dissemination and use of data, the Chinese method is quite the 
opposite.  
China’s miraculous advances in the field, on the other hand, have relied more on 
mass, that is to say, free enterprising, unchained competition, blatant plagiarism, and a 
continuously growing number of scientists focused on AI, all supported and subsidized by 
the government.31 This approach has allowed the Chinese government to kick-start 
development and leverage their control of information by facilitating unrestricted use of 
 
27 Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Military Innovation in the AI Revolution,” The RUSI Journal 164, no. 5–6 
(September 19, 2019): 26–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1693803 ; Zhu Feng et al., 
“Inspiration for Battlefield Situation Cognition from AI Military Programs Launched by DARPA of USA 
and Development of AI Technology,” in Theory, Methodology, Tools and Applications for Modeling and 
Simulation of Complex Systems, ed. Lin Zhang, Xiao Song, and Yunjie Wu, vol. 644 (Singapore: Springer 
Singapore, 2016), 566–77, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2666-9_57 ; R. Rasch, A. Kott, and K.D. 
Forbus, “Incorporating AI into Military Decision Making: An Experiment,” IEEE Intelligent Systems 18, 
no. 4 (July 2003): 18–26, https://doi.org/10.1109/MIS.2003.1217624.  
28 Edward Moore Geist, “It’s Already Too Late to Stop the AI Arms Race—We Must Manage It 
Instead,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 5 (September 2, 2016): 319, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1216672.  
29 Feng et al., “Inspiration for Battlefield Situation Cognition from AI Military Programs Launched by 
DARPA of USA and Development of AI Technology,” 567. 
30 Lee, AI Superpowers, 136. 
31 Gregory C. Allen, Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic Thinking on 
Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2019), 
8–9, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/understanding-chinas-ai-strategy.  
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information within their own country.32 So far, this unregulated approach by the Chinese 
has proven to be an effective method, according to Lee.33 Currently, several researchers 
agree that the state-backed Chinese development process and the huge amount of 
unregulated data, allows China to compete at the same level as American academia and 
company-led research.34 
By contrast, as the Swedish Defence Research Institute (SDRA) paper by Peter 
Svenmarck et al. “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military 
Applications,” prepared for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), points out, 
regardless of the chosen approach, the three main challenges of transparency, security, and 
data must be considered when implementing AI into Military Activities.35 First, whether 
the product relies on Machine Learning (ML) or Deep Learning (DL), the actual algorithms 
producing the result need to be known and evaluated.36 Revealing the algorithms seldom 
lies in the interest of the seller of the product, however, since these are the actual source of 
the product, and revealing them makes the company more vulnerable to exploitation and 
loss of information.37 Furthermore, even if the algorithms are known, the need for an 
educated procurement chain arises, entailing close cooperation with academia or constant 
recruitment and education of personnel, as described by Elsa B. Kania in her article 
“Chinese Military Innovation in the AI Revolution.”38 Further, in their recent article 
published in War On The Rocks: “Can Warfighters Remain the Masters of AI?,” Harrison 
 
32 Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” 9. 
33 Lee, AI Superpowers, 82–84. 
34 Lee, 91–92; Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 167; Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an 
Era of Artificial Intelligence,” 12. 
35 Peter Svenmarck et al., “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military 
Applications,” NATO Big Data and Artificial Intelligence for Military Decision Making, (Stockholm: 
Swedish Defence Research Agency, May 2018), 4, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326774966_Possibilities_and_Challenges_for_Artificial_Intellige
nce_in_Military_Applications.  
36 Svenmarck et al., 2. 
37 Lee, AI Superpowers, 91. 
38 Kania, “Chinese Military Innovation in the AI Revolution,” 34. 
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Schramm and Jeff Kline highlight the problem of obtaining sufficiently educated personnel 
to utilize AI.39 
Second, implementing AI offers new security considerations for organizations; how 
will commercial companies guarantee a military organization that the enemy does not have 
insight into and the ability to exploit weaknesses in these developments through 
manipulation of the data or the model?40 Albeit companies and universities responsible for 
developing the algorithms might have a strong incentive for keeping them a secret, it has 
hardly prevented copying and exploitation in the past.41 There seems to be a great risk of 
buying into a system at great cost, only to have the system become a risk rather than an 
asset for the organization. Furthermore, the possible manipulation of data is a problem that 
was noted as early as 1985 by Robert Trappl in his book Impacts of Artificial Intelligence, 
and emphasized in 2018 by Daniel S. Hoadley and Nathan J. Lucas in their Congressional 
Research Service paper “Artificial Intelligence and National Security.”42 As the systems 
themselves are getting more and more complicated, the possibilities to identify and correct 
a faulty system becomes harder and harder, if not impossible in a time-sensitive situation 
such as war.43 This statement certainly applies today, as it is getting hard even for the 
designers to back-track the process within several layers of DL.44 
Lastly, the available data quantities and quality are crucial in determining what kind 
of systems to consider and to what degree it will be effective enough to motivate the 
 
39 Harrison Schramm and Jeff Kline, “Can Warfighters Remain the Masters of AI?” War on the 
Rocks, February 6, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/can-warfighters-remain-the-masters-of-ai/.  
40 Svenmarck et al., “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military Applications,” 
7. 
41 Lee, AI Superpowers, 91. 
42 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 37; Daniel S. Hoadley and Nathan J. Lucas, Artificial 
Intelligence and National Security, CRS Report R45178 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2018), 28–30, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1157028/m1/1/.  
43 Trappl, Impacts of Artificial Intelligence, 37. 
44 Hoadley and Lucas, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” 31. 
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investment.45 As Lee points out, an organization might not reap the anticipated benefits of 
acquiring a costly AI system if the organization lacks access to considerable amounts of 
the “right” data to analyze.46 For a relatively small community, such as SOF, this could 
cause a problem.47 Therefore, it seems wise to consider working together with other 
countries and organizations to maximize the benefits of AI systems. However, this also 
implies that interagency regulations and international law, as well as national laws, must 
be taken into consideration, furthering the need for a complete judicial analysis before 
acquiring certain systems.48 
Even though the considerations mentioned previously apply to military 
procurement of AI in general, they might provide a foundation for further development of 
a smaller set of guidelines more specifically applicable to the needs of SOF. Given that 
SOF units and the special circumstances surrounding their missions often require bespoke 
equipment, employed under special conditions, the Joint Publication 3-05 describes Special 
Operations as: 
Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, 
equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: 
time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through 
indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of 
risk.49 
As noticed by Michael A. Pfarrer in his 2000 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
master’s thesis “Optimizing Procurement of Special Operations Weapons,” the usual 
procurement process of a nation’s army, air force, or navy seldom meets the requirements 
 
45 Svenmarck et al., “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military Applications,” 
8. 
46 Lee, AI Superpowers, 56. 
47 Elliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, 
Harvard Studies of International Affairs 40 (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs at Harvard 
University, 1978), 54. 
48 Richard Kemp, Legal Aspects of Artificial Intelligence (London, UK: Kemp It Law, 2016), 1.  
49 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
GL-11, http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/July/jp3_05.pdf.  
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of the SOF community.50 Therefore, it seems likely that separate factors might apply for a 
smaller organization, such as SOF, when considering implementation of AI into the 
organization.  
B. SUMMARY 
Even though AI may continue to change several aspects of society, many questions 
still need addressing before this technology turns life upside down. History provides many 
examples when innovation has altered the world, often for the better in retrospect. Not 
many innovations have revolutionized society within a few years, but rather most have led 
to incremental changes to which the world has adapted. As the world continues to change, 
it seems likely that the integration and advances in AI will continue to gradually affect the 
military as well. Nonetheless, considering humans’ reluctance to adapt to changes, SOF 
and their unique requirements might be fortuitously positioned at the tip of the spear in this 
technological race, if they can adapt a sound procurement process for the assessment and 
acquisition of AI. 
  
 
50 Michael A. Pfarrer, “Optimizing Procurement of Special Operations Weapons and Equipment” 





III. RESEARCH APPROACH 
Aiming to produce a SOF-specific model to assist in the assessment of whether a 
particular type of AI is viable for implementation, this capstone builds on the foundational 
considerations of transparency, security, and data identified in the previously mentioned 
cooperative paper from NATO and the SDRA, “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial 
Intelligence in Military Applications.” To develop a model, this research uses an iterative 
effort to identify SOF-specific factors through a combination of secondary sources and 
interviews. In the next section, the applicability of the chosen model in a SOF-specific 
context is explained, followed by a description of the proposed conduct and selected 
method of the research. Finally, a summary of the expected results of the study clarifies 
the aim of the chosen approach. 
A. TENTATIVE MODEL FOR CONSIDERING AI PROCUREMENT 
Representing the three areas of primary concern for military acquisition of AI 
products, the SDRA paper’s aim is to present NATO forces with guidelines for what to 
consider before investing in AI. These areas are further elaborated on in the previous 




Since these factors are presented as essential considerations when investigating the 
potential benefits and risks of AI, they will provide the foundation for analysis in this 
capstone.51   As an integral part of a nation’s military forces, SOF often provide the testbed 
for new tactics, equipment, and rely on different procurement chains, budget, and 
operational requirements.52  Therefore, based on the assumption that SOF has specific 
 
51 Svenmarck et al., “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military Applications,” 
1. 
52 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, 31–32. 
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needs and structural differences from the military in general, the developed model should 
reflect these needs in other or new areas of consideration for SOF, as they relate to AI. 
Hence, the overarching question of this capstone is: What factors must the SOF community 
consider when acquiring and evaluating new AI capabilities?  
To identify these factors and determine what the SOF community can leverage in 
order to maintain the edge within AI implementation, the following questions provide the 
framework for the analysis: 
o What is currently considered to be AI? 
 As there is no consensus on what constitutes AI, does this debate 
provide opportunities, or does it only present hurdles to overcome? 
o What are the current ethical considerations regarding AI? 
 What is perceived as the most fundamental ethical problem with AI 
and does this make some areas of AI more troublesome for 
implementation? 
o What are the demands for infrastructure? 
 Do the requirements for infrastructure, maintenance, educated 
personnel, or need for data make some of the current AI inventions 
unsuitable for SOF? 
o How can AI be evaluated for effectiveness? 
 How can the actual efficacy of implementation be measured and 
what does this imply for organizations acquiring products? 
o What is the cost of implementing AI? 
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 Does the cost of certain AI-based systems prevent a smaller 
organization from acquiring equipment, regardless of perceived 
benefit? 
o How can SOF leverage its shorter procurement chains? 
 Are there any benefits to acquiring existing AI “Commercial of the 
Shelf” (COTS) products compared to bespoke military products? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Aiming is to discover something new rather than testing an existing theory, this 
capstone utilizes a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both qualitative and 
quantitative data. Since the research to a large extent will be iterative, based on reading and 
interpreting text, a hermeneutic approach fits the study well, as explained by Sebastian K. 
Boell and Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic in their article “A Hermeneutic Approach for 
Conducting Literature Reviews and Literature Searches”:  
The hermeneutic route to understanding is always iterative: an 
understanding of a text (a part) draws from the reader’s preunderstanding 
of a context (a whole); and vice versa, the understanding of a context (a 
whole) develops from understanding individual texts or text equivalents 
(parts).53 
Furthermore, with the intent to explore how AI fits into the greater context of 
military applications, a holistic, qualitative approach is chosen, rather than exploring the 
individual metrics of some particular products within the AI field.54 On the other hand, as 
qualitative studies do not rely on quantifiable data, the validity of the research is often 
questioned; therefore, several sources of data are used to enhance the credibility of the 
 
53 Sebastian K. Boell and Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic, “A Hermeneutic Approach for Conducting 
Literature Reviews and Literature Searches,” Communications of the Association for Information Systems 
34 (2014): 263, https://doi.org/10.17705/1CAIS.03412.  
54 Barbara M. Wildemuth, Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and 
Library Science, 2nd ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2017), 319. 
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study through the use of data triangulation.55 If there are existing quantitative data 
available to strengthen the findings of the research further, these are incorporated, as 
suggested by David A. Lake, in his -ism critical article: “Why “isms” Are Evil: Theory, 
Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress.”56  
C. DATA COLLECTION 
A mix of textual analysis, interviews, and survey of the current product 
developments in the field of AI is used to provide the necessary information for the 
research. Although most information can be acquired through secondary sources like 
books, the internet, and papers written on the subject, the field of AI is continually 
changing. Therefore, the information gathered through secondary sources is complemented 
by interviews conducted with persons connected to relevant AI competencies within the 
commercial sector, military, and academia. Furthermore, throughout the research, recent 
developments in AI use in the military reported through news outlets and seminars are 
incorporated to maintain relevancy. Following is a brief clarification of the sources. 
1. Secondary Sources 
Current articles, books, and theses provide the foundation for the research. Both 
AI-oriented literature and works regarding military procurement are utilized to evaluate 
and produce a working model. Sources were scrutinized for relevance, credibility, and 
potential biases. Journals used for the research consist of military publications, such as War 
on the Rocks, conference proceedings, and RAND, as well as technology-centric 
publications like MIT Technology Review and other publications on AI development. 
However, as the AI field is continually changing, there is a risk that new material emerges 
during the research, which is why it becomes imperative to repeat and update the analysis 
constantly. 
 
55 Lisa A. Guion, David C. Diehl, and Debra McDonald, “View of Triangulation: Establishing the 
Validity of Qualitative Studies,” EDIS 2011, no. 8 (August 2011): 1–2, https://doi.org/10.32473/edis-
fy394-2011.  
56 David A. Lake, “Why ‘Isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments 





Through the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) collaboration with several local 
AI corporations in the San Francisco area, the authors gained access to commercial 
companies producing military applications, which allows the research to explore a non-
military perspective on military procurement. Since this capstone uses an inductive method 
and qualitative research strategy with a focused group as its design, data is gathered through 
oral interviews using a pre-approved bank of questions in compliance with the NPS Human 
Research Protection Program Office & Institutional Review Board (IRB) process.57 
Although there are disadvantages to face-to-face meetings as they are time-consuming, and 
require coding and transcription, the interviews are conducted face-to-face through media 
platforms, allowing for the assessment body language, the ability to ask to follow-up 
questions, and the reduction in delay between questions and answers.58 Furthermore, even 
though the interviews are semi-structured, meaning there is a set of questions to follow, 
this approach still allows for the interviewer and the interviewee to elaborate on answers 
and follow up on issues identified in during the interview.59 At the same time, since 
commercial companies are driven by the need for continued profit, this was considered 
when evaluating the information collected from company representatives. The interviews 
were recorded, coded, and transcribed to allow for back-tracing.  
3. Seminars and Product Fairs 
Seminars oriented towards military application can provide information outside the 
previously mentioned sources, thereby adding a new perspective based on the actual market 
available compared to the more objective views of singular enterprises. However, to 
identify a possible divide between the needs of the SOF and the regular military, the 
 
57 “Human Research Protection Program Office & Institutional Review Board (IRB),” Naval 
Postgraduate School, accessed May 4, 2021, https://nps.edu/web/research/irb-home.  
58 Raymond Opdenakker, “Advantages and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques in 
Qualitative Research,” Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 7, no. 4 
(September 2006): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.17169/fqs-7.4.175.  
59 Neil Stephens, “Collecting Data from Elites and Ultra Elites: Telephone and Face-to-Face 




research on current capabilities offered helps identify potential areas targeted by the 
commercial sector when selling to specific customers. 
Due to the current effect of Covid-19, most seminars and product fairs were 
suspended during the information-gathering process for this capstone. Although further 
direct access, apart from the seminars and company briefs attended, would have been 
preferable; articles, product leaflets, and news outlets have supplemented as sources for 
data gathering.  
D. VALIDITY OF SOURCES 
Information tends to be subjective, whether intentionally or not. Therefore, all 
sources used in the research are scrutinized according to the following factors based on the 
Currency, Relevance, Authority, Accuracy, and Purpose (CRAAP) test criteria:60  
• Type: Relates to the actual nature of the information, such as peer-
reviewed articles, interviews, seminars, product leaflets, or product 
spokespersons. 
• Possible dependence: Does the source of information have connections or 
demands that might produce a biased result?  
• First or secondhand information: Is the source providing its unique 
knowledge, or is the information given based on previous or other 
sources? 
• Tendencies: Is the source likely to be favorable of a specific idea or 
concept? 
Keeping this simple framework in mind, while conducting the research, the authors 
could reduce the risk of promoting a single point of view. Furthermore, to mitigate the 
 
60 Dawn Emsellem Wichowski and Laura E. Kohl. “Establishing Credibility in the Information 
Jungle: Blogs, Microblogs, and the CRAAP Test.” In Online Credibility and Digital Ethos: Evaluating 
Computer-Mediated Communication, ed. Moe Folk and Shawn Apostel (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2013), 
231. http://doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-2663-8.ch013.  
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apparent potential for bias, several types of sources and methods of data collection 
(triangulation of information) are used.61 However, if a source provides valuable 
information but can be questioned regarding credibility or potential bias, the authors 
mention that in the text. 
E. EXPECTED RESULTS 
Since the commercial sector currently is at the forefront of development in AI, there 
is a myriad of innovations appearing on the market. The short lifespan of these inventions 
does not justify significant investment since there will soon be a new, better, faster, and 
more potent products on the market. Provided the opportunities a fast-moving field such as 
AI offers, readily available COTS products, combined with the quicker SOF procurement 
chain procurement, should present SOF with the opportunity to maintain the edge on the 
battlefield. On the other hand, since there is, and will continue to exist, a need to develop 
highly specialized systems for managing complex tasks that require large infrastructures 
for data management, maintenance, and know-how as well as special considerations 
regarding their effects on existing systems, these more demanding, bespoke systems 
present a problem for the smaller SOF communities. Yet, in recognizing the need for both 
rapid procurement and robust infrastructure, it should be possible to establish a division of 
responsibilities regarding the implementation of AI between SOF and the regular armed 
forces. Building on the traditional use of SOF as a platform for experimentation, with a 
focus on the implementation of COTS products, while the regular armed forces focus on 
the demands of more complex AI-systems, can form a division of responsibilities within 
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In this chapter, the three main pillars of transparency, security, and data proposed 
for the tentative model are analyzed and their actual meaning discussed. Using both 
historical and contemporary research, this chapter scrutinizes the implications and 
possibilities of the three pillars for their relevance when answering the overarching 
research question of what SOF must consider when acquiring AI. Each pillar is first 
presented and the connection to AI established, followed by an examination. Its historical 
meaning is contrasted against contemporary research and its relevance to AI is discussed. 
Finally, a summary of the analysis presents the identified specific implications for SOF 
procurement of AI. 
A. TRANSPARENCY 
In the case of AI, transparency often refers to whether it is possible to explain, 
understand, and interpret the actions and results of the AI-model, either focusing on how 
an AI-model reaches its decision or examining the results.62  Based on the notion that AI 
will ultimately reach a point where it surpasses human understanding and develop a mind 
of its own, one prevailing argument has been that AI needs to be transparent in order to be 
trusted.63 With the apocalyptic versions of society depicted in films like James Cameron’s 
The Terminator and Stanley Kubrick’s classic 2001: A Space Odyssey where AI takes on 
a life of its own and refuses to cooperate with humans, as well as recent failures of self-
driving cars in mind, trust in AI continues to be an issue that is highly debated.64 Aiming 
to further explore the argument that transparency is necessary, the actual meaning of 
transparency and its relation to trust is explored, followed by its implications for 
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transparency in AI. Finally, building on the arguments made in the subsequent discussion, 
three suggestions are proposed to enhance the effects of transparency to promote trust in 
AI.  
This analysis concludes that while transparency might be a good way to achieve 
quality assurance, institutions and organizations can only leverage transparency if they are 
capable of accurately evaluating the products. To best benefit from transparency, 
procurement of AI should rely on historically trustworthy partners and focus on increasing 
the knowledge within organizations and institutions to manage the user’s expectations on 
AI. Trust in AI, then, is more reliant on human perception, interaction, and the 
trustworthiness of the companies developing future solutions than the actual transparency 
of AI itself. 
1. Transparency and Trust 
Transparency as a term, although widely used and hard to define, is often related to 
the ability to create trust and has been frequently used in the field of economics.65 One 
example is Brad L. Rawlins’ paper from 2008 “Measuring the Relationship between 
Organizational Transparency and Employee Trust,” in which Rawlins suggests that an 
individual’s perception of an organization’s transparency is closely related to the level of 
trust.66 Rawlins adheres to Elinor Ostrom and James Walker’s definition of trust in the 
book Whom Can We Trust?, “the willingness to take some risk in relation to other 
individuals on the expectation that the others will reciprocate.”67 The idea that presenting 
vulnerability is necessary to build trust, not only correlates with transparency as a concept 
of being accountable and sharing information that is potentially harmful, but also builds on 
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Whom Can We Trust? How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible, ed. Karen S. Cook, 
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Ostrom’s belief that reciprocity in order to be trusted, you need to show trust — is needed 
for trust to be beneficial. However, research more focused on the correlation between 
expectations and trust, conducted by René F. Kizilicec from Stanford University, suggests 
that although there is a correlation between transparency and trust, the perception of 
violated expectations greatly affects the benefits of transparency.68 
Trust is also a topic that has been thoroughly researched in several different areas, 
such as sociology, economy, and political science.69 With this in mind, trust is often 
explored through different types of social exchanges of goods between people. In his article 
“The Market for Lemons,” Nobel Prize winning author George Akerlof posits that there is 
a clear link between information asymmetry, uncertainty, and the level of trust in a market. 
Akerlof argues the need for institutions to control and maintain a level of certainty for a 
market to exist.70 Although these ideas do not directly assess the effects of transparency, 
the idea of limiting the information asymmetry and uncertainty for trust to exist can be 
related to the level of transparency of a product.  
Contrary to Akerlof´s belief in institutional trust, another Nobel Prize winning 
scientist, Elinor Ostrom, argues in her article “Solving the Problem of the Commons,” that 
the need for institutions is overemphasized since trust is based on reciprocity rather than 
sanctions alone.71  Ostrom’s conclusions are further supported by Karen S. Cook, Russel 
Hardin, and Margaret Levi, who conclude that “A trust relation emerges out of mutual 
interdependence and the knowledge developed over time of reciprocal trustworthiness.”72 
 
68 René F. Kizilcec, “How Much Information?: Effects of Transparency on Trust in an Algorithmic 
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Furthermore, Cook, Hardin, and Levi dismiss the notion that trust is provided by 
regulations and institutions. Instead, they argue that institutions and regulations are 
necessary when trust does not exist, since trust is an encapsulated interest —our expectancy 
that our interest and the other party’s interest coincide to be mutually beneficial— where 
the incentive of being trustworthy is incumbent upon the parties.73  
In terms of trust in AI, one question is whether trust should be directed at the actual 
AI model or how the model is perceived by its users.74 Marco Ribeiro, Sameer Singh, and 
Carlos Guestrin propose that for humans to trust AI, interpretability and explainability is 
crucial.75 Based on their argument that “if the users do not trust a model or a prediction, 
they will not use it,” they conclude that individuals need a level of transparency to trust 
AI.76 On the other hand, Andrea Ferrario, Michele Loi,  and Eleonora Viganò of the 
Mobiliar Lab for Analytics in Zürich contest this idea and argue that trustworthiness rather 
relies on the perception and education of the user rather than the actual AI model itself.77 
Furthermore, they refute the idea that lack of trust will prohibit the use of AI; instead, they 
relate the trust in AI to necessity. The AI model will be considered relatively trustworthy 
if the user is limited in options, but an AI is absolutely trustworthy if it is the best option 
available.78  
2. Transparency in AI 
Transparency in AI can simply be explained as “for a model to be fully understood, 
a human should be able to take the input data together with the parameters of the model 
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and in reasonable time step through every calculation required to produce a prediction.”79 
Simply put, a human has to be able to understand how and why an AI system has reached 
its conclusion in order to be able to trust the outcome.80 Transparency, then, allows buyers 
to trust sellers and their product by evaluating the quality, as argued by Akerlof in “The 
Market for Lemons.”81 Following Akerlof’s argument, institutions and other mechanisms 
can therefore be used to ensure the quality and limit the asymmetry of information in the 
market, making buyers trust the sellers.82 Nonetheless, as research has shown quality 
assurance and product transparency can affect trade in the opposite way, making looser 
bonds between buyers possible as the risk of investment goes down.83 This, then, would 
indicate that if transparency equates to quality assurance, it might also negate the need for 
trust under certain circumstances.  
Similar to the arguments just described, Akerlof posits that uncertainty, and the 
information asymmetry, must be reduced between the buyer and seller of goods to create a 
functioning market. Therefore, if there is a way for institutions to certify the quality of a 
product, there will be a reason for the buyer to trust the seller, preventing the market from 
being filled with ‘lemons.’84 In this aspect, the need for transparency seems to hold true: 
If the asymmetry in information between the seller and buyer is minimized through the 
interpretability and explainability of the product, this should provide the basis for building 
trust.85 Furthermore, in providing insight into the workings of the products, a manufacturer 
fulfills the parameter of exposing vulnerability, which aligns with Ostrom and Walker’s 
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concept of trust.86 There are some indications, however, that transparency might be 
counterproductive to trust as well.  
First, Brad Rawlings’ somewhat brash definition of transparency put forward in his 
paper “Measuring the Relationship between Organizational Transparency and Employee 
Trust,” where he states that “Simply put, transparency is the opposite of secrecy,” raises 
questions about transparency’s applicability in the realm of AI.87 As several studies point 
out, attacks against AI can be significantly more effective if information about the target is 
known.88 Therefore, it seems that although transparency can act as a factor in building 
trust, the gains of transparency must be weighed against the security implications for AI.89 
Hence, the vulnerability aspect seems to limit the utility of transparency under certain 
conditions. 
Secondly, as René F. Kizilcec’s paper “Much Information? Effects of Transparency 
on Trust in an Algorithmic Interface” suggests: “Transparency may promote or erode 
users’ trust in a system by changing beliefs about its trustworthiness.”90  Kizilcec’s study 
suggests that only when the expectations of the user have not been violated can increased 
transparency also affect trust positively. Conversely, too much information seemed to 
negate the positive effect when expectations were violated.91 This would imply that in an 
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AI context, transparency to a certain degree can maintain trust, but ultimately, trust is based 
on products meeting expectations.  
3. Trust in AI 
Trust and trustworthiness are complex issues that are hard to define. However, 
consistent with both Elinor Ostrom’s argument about the need for communication and 
repeated interactions, as well as Akerlof’s point about the need for quality assurance, 
Russel Hardin sums it up pretty well in his book Trust and Trustworthiness:  
If we consider all the trust relations we experience, we find that a large 
fraction of them fall into three categories: relationships or interactions that 
are iterated, those that are backed up by institutions, and those that are 
mediated by other (noninstitutional) third parties.92 
In terms of AI, trust seems to fall into these three categories: people have re-
occurring interactions with AI, they trust institutions and certain brands to validate the 
performance of AI being sold in the market, and they expect academics and inventors to 
strive for the greater good of the public. Furthermore, in order to clarify the relationship 
between trust and public relations, in their 1999 paper “Guidelines for Measuring 
Relationships in Public Relations,” Linda Childers Hon and James Grunig point out that 
perceived integrity, dependability, and competence make up the three factors of trust in a 
relationship.93 With this in mind, trust is the expectation for another party to consistently 
fulfill expectations based on perceived capabilities.94 Transferred to AI, this would imply 
that it is our knowledge and expectations on the performance of AI models, based on the 
manufacturer’s promise, that makes up the foundation for our trust. 
In their article “In AI We Trust Incrementally: A Multi-layer Model of Trust to 
Analyze Human-Artificial Intelligence Interactions” Andrea Ferrario, Michele Loi, and 
Eleonora Viganò provide support for the previous argument. First, they posit that “In AI, 
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the strength of evidence of trustworthiness regarding properties of AI systems decreases 
with the decreasing expertise of the agent interacting with the systems.”95 This implies that 
the level of education of the operator is relevant for the perceived trust in a certain system 
or model. This correlates with the argument previously mentioned by Kizilcec where 
information is only necessary to a certain point. Second, Ferrario et al. suggest that the 
trustworthiness of AI is directly related to the options available as an alternative solution.96 
In short, if there are no other solutions available, then users tend to subjectively trust the 
chosen solution. As previously mentioned, since AI has already proliferated in society, and 
lacking alternative solutions, we already subjectively trust AI.  
4. Implications of Transparency for Trust in AI 
Considering the arguments made previously, transparency seems to be a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, transparency can promote trust by removing uncertainty 
and information asymmetry. On the other hand, there also seems to be a limit to how much 
transparency is beneficial for trust, and instead decreases trust by threatening to make the 
systems vulnerable. Crucial for transparency, then, is to acknowledge that trust in AI seems 
to depend at least as much on the user’s perception of the product as the product itself. 
Considering that the effect of transparency is closely related to the education level of the 
personnel responsible for utilizing the AI, as both Kizilcec’s and the Ferrario, Loi, and 
Viganò’s papers argue, their logic seems reasonable: Building trust in AI is more about 
expectation management than the actual transparency or results of the products 
themselves.97  Yet, given the proper education of personnel evaluating the AI product, 
transparency can both increase trust and serve as a quality assurance.  
In order to clarify the argument just presented, a car might provide a good analogy. 
We trust our car to work, and when it does not, we usually hand it over to a mechanic for 
repairs. Even though all information about the inner workings of a car might be readily 
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available, few can say that they know everything about how their vehicle works. If 
problems keep occurring, the dependability of the car is in question, and we tend to lose 
trust in our car. While the mechanic can perceive the problems as minor, this does not 
mitigate the fact that we cannot use the car during the time it takes to repair it. 
Consequently, if we have similar experiences with several cars from the same 
manufacturer, the chances are that next time, we will choose a different brand. That said, 
we rarely lose trust in all vehicles and resort to walking, especially if there are no viable 
alternatives available.98 Instead, we might end up with a new car, which we trust, until it 
too starts to break down. 
In the context of AI, trust does not seem to be all that different. Although some 
argue that full transparency is required and persons operating AI systems should be experts, 
this hardly seems like a realistic solution. Instead, we should be practical and focus on 
maintaining and increasing the existing trust by providing a foundation where we can 
benefit from transparency. Following are three suggestions on how transparency can 
increase trust in AI: 
a. Trustworthy Partners 
In the field of AI, there are certain companies that invoke more trust than others, 
such as Google, Microsoft, or Apple.99 As these companies stake their reputation on their 
products, they also make themselves vulnerable, providing a foundation for trust and a 
guarantee for quality.100 Although the existing trust might not lie in specific AI models, 
their liability remains the same. The ability to build on this existing trust (brand naming) 
and providing sufficient transparency for the products to be evaluated by qualified 
personnel (institutions) should increase public trust in products along with the need for 
quality assurance, as argued by Akerlof.101 Hence, in this case, transparency also relates 
 
98 Ferrario, Loi, and Viganò, 536. 
99 Gry Hasselbalch, “Why Trust in AI Is Not Enough,” Dataethics (blog), September 3, 2019, 
https://dataethics.eu/why-trust-in-ai-is-not-enough/. 
100 Walker and Ostrom, “Trust and Reciprocity as Foundations for Cooperation,” 91. 
101 Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’,” 500. 
 
30 
to the reciprocal part of trust, where companies are willing to provide transparency into 
their corporations to remain trusted by the users. 
b. Education 
As highlighted in the 2020 Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) report “A 
Warning from Tomorrow,” there is a deficit in the number of skilled personnel to operate 
and evaluate the systems, even in an AI superpower such as the United States.102 With this 
shortcoming in mind, organizations and institutions should prioritize the education of a 
workforce responsible for the evaluation of AI. As argued by Ferrario, Loi, and Viganò, to 
best benefit from transparency, manufacturers need an educated counterpart to be able to 
evaluate their product. However, building on the example of trust in cars, perhaps we 
should not aim for a nation of mechanics, but rather a workforce of informed users with AI 
driver’s licenses, backed up by mechanics. 
c. Expectation Management 
Although transparency might give an insight into the expected functionality of a 
new product, it will not be able to create trust if the product is perceived as insecure, 
undependable, or unable to produce the expected results. Therefore, Kizilcec’s argument 
about expectation management seems crucial. However, since proper evaluation of 
products is necessary to produce reasonable expectations, Akerlof ‘s argument regarding 
the need for quality assurance and institutions also holds true. Hence, a certain level of 
transparency is necessary to allow institutions and organizations to evaluate products in 
order to produce reasonable expectations in users. Through providing sufficient 
transparency, producers can help manage the expectations of users to maintain and increase 
trust, as argued by Kizilcec.  
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5. Conclusion Analysis of Transparency 
AI is, and will continue to be, an issue of debate for the foreseeable future. Merely 
the fact that there is no clear definition of what actually constitutes AI is enough for several 
books to be written. However, in the debate about the need for transparency as a foundation 
for trust, three points can be made: First, although transparency is an essential part of 
quality assurance and allows for trust to be maintained, human perception and historical 
interaction seem to play a more important part in trusting AI. Furthermore, considering the 
security implications related to transparency in AI, maintaining trustworthy partners 
remains crucial. Second, the effect of transparency in building trust is closely related to the 
potential user’s level of understanding and ability to evaluate the products. To benefit fully 
from transparency, organizations must focus efforts on educating operators supported by a 
core of highly skilled personnel, who are able to evaluate the potential benefits of 
incorporation of AI. Third, transparency can provide the foundation for organizations and 
institutions to manage the expectations for AI. Allowing for products to be scrutinized can 
help organizations align expectations with actual results delivered, thereby increasing and 
maintaining trust in AI when the products are consistently reliable and dependable at 
performing a given task. 
Transparency, then, does not automatically equate to increased trust in AI. 
Transparency relies on the institutions, organizations, and the user’s ability to evaluate the 
products and correctly assess the benefits and expected results of the products. In a world 
where AI is already incorporated throughout society, people have already begun to trust AI 
by proxy. Given this reality, transparency should be recognized as the means to enhance 
the already existing trust, instead of a requirement to build trust. 
B. SECURITY 
As most nations have already implemented different applications using AI within 
their societies, military establishments around the world find themselves faced with the 
fact that AI solutions are a part of both the offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.103 
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While the United States has adopted a gradual and restrictive approach, China opts for an 
unrestricted implementation, possibly outpacing the rest of the world in the near future.104 
In times of crisis, such as the Covid-19 outbreak, however, even the Western world has 
acknowledged that the benefits of speeding up the use of AI sometimes outweighs the 
risks.105 At first glance, the gains of unrestricted and quick implementation of AI can seem 
beneficial for the military. Still, since AI and the sub-field of ML to a high degree depend 
on learning based on large quantities of data, this creates novel weaknesses in a nation’s 
cyber defense.106 Even though most states have cyber strategies in place, these seldom 
address the specific threats related to AI. Therefore, the risks associated with learning from 
data provides the foundation for the following AI specific security assessment.  
Focusing on the potential dangers of implementing AI into existing structures, this 
analysis suggests that secrecy through regulations and quality assurance through 
institutions can add a much-needed layer of protection. To achieve this, the military needs 
to collaborate with trusted partners in the civilian sector, implement institutions for quality 
assurance, and set realistic goals. 
1. Risks Related to ML 
The use of AI-augmented hacking and counter-hacking has been going on for some 
time.107 As the use of ML-based systems increases in this domain, the need for subsequent 
ML implementations to counter these incursions increases. In the foreseeable future, any 
system not implementing some sort of ML-driven defense will inevitably succumb to 
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attacks.108 Nevertheless, as ML is incorporated into the defense of important 
infrastructure, it also allows for attacks directed at the heart of ML. Here, two main efforts 
of attack stand out and are explored further: Poisoning attacks and evasion attacks.109 
Poisoning attacks target the ML algorithms and learning data (the ML model) by 
introducing new associations into the model to corrupt the model.110 Considering the 
“Black box” dilemma caused by the use of deep neural networks (DNN) in some parts of 
ML, where humans have a hard time analyzing how the system has arrived at a certain 
conclusion, the risk of having faulty models operating undetected increases.111 Evasion 
attacks are instead aimed at misguiding an otherwise working model into faulty 
classification by presenting an adversarial example.112 In the following paragraphs, 
poisoning, evasion attacks, and common ways to defend against these attacks are presented. 
a. Poisoning Attacks 
In order to train a machine, a data set is determined by the model’s intended aim, 
be it analysis of pictures of objects for classification, data streams to determine flows in a 
network, or words for a linguistic model, and used for initial learning.113 As further 
training of the model is needed, this will occur either through the relearning of specific data 
sets or directly during the use of the model. Regardless of the method, it is the data used 
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for learning that provides a foundation for the model to execute its given task.114 Poisoning 
works by manipulating the data set used for learning or even by changing the algorithm 
itself to create “back doors” into a seemingly functioning system.115 If the algorithm can 
be augmented through introducing changes in a neural network, these will merge, 
essentially becoming a part of the model. As the learning process depends on the integrity 
of the algorithm, any alterations can render the model practically useless.116 If undetected, 
these attacks can be used to deceive the opponent, trigger responses, or degrade trust in a 
system. 
Manipulating the initial data training set or the algorithm in production is obviously 
the most effective way, since the adversary can more or less input any number of backdoors 
or totally alter the behavior of the model.117 Unfortunately, direct access to the initial 
learning data is not always required, since some types of ML also “learn on the job.” The 
reoccurring training of models offers possibilities for attack through novel methods by 
introducing data sets aimed at dislocating the model’s boundaries in the ongoing learning 
process. If the network from which the model learns is known and data can be infused into 
the stored data sets used for relearning, then the boundaries of the model can be skewed to 
misinterpret information, or even allow for a back door.118 For instance, if a system learns 
to always classify a certain string of data as benign, this string can then be attached to any 
malicious hardware in the future to hamper the effectiveness of the system further. 
Although not as effective a method as directly controlling the algorithm or data, it offers 
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an adversary a more obtainable option to interfere with a potential target’s decision 
chains.119  
Defense against poisoning has proven hard, but the most common way is through 
outlier identification, or adversarial-noise resilient regression.120 The basic idea of this 
method is that the adversarial training example can be classified as an outlier, and therefore 
be disregarded in the training process.121 Another approach that shows signs of efficiency 
is the use of micro-models, where small sets of the larger training data are used to trains 
several models, which then assess the large data together, basically sanitizing the large data 
set from anomalies.122 
b. Evasion Attacks 
Even though the learning data and the algorithm might be intact, and the system 
conducts the assigned duties flawlessly, the possibility to exploit flaws in the algorithms to 
evade accurate categorization exists. Through minor alterations in the input data, a model 
can be tricked into misclassifying data. Known as evasion attacks or adversarial examples, 
these can produce spectacular results.123 One famous example of this is when an AI system 
was tricked into categorizing a STOP sign as a 45-miles per hour sign through the simple 
method of applying some tape to the road sign.124 More typical use, though, is the inclusion 
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of certain pictures, phrases, or words in an email to trick spam filters into classifying the 
mail as safe.125  
There are several categories of evasion attacks, relying on different methods: 
Gradient attacks leverage the knowledge of the algorithm and score based attacks utilize 
the predicted scores of a model, while transfer based attacks require knowledge of the 
learning data sets.126 Although most of these attacks require some knowledge of the model 
attacked, recent studies suggest that systems can be attacked with limited or no knowledge 
of the model.127 Furthermore, one of the difficulties related to defending against these 
attacks is that it is not totally clear why these attacks work.128  
Although there are many existing methods to increase resistance against evasion 
attacks—such as regulating the effect an input has on the gradient of the model, or a multi-
model defense where the model is supported by several models of the same family to 
increase success—the most common is through different methods of adversary training.129 
This method is based on presenting adversarial examples in a controlled way to teach the 
model to avoid misclassifications. Although the method can make the models more robust, 
it has also proven to make models less reliable.130 As more effort is put into the research 
of defense against these attacks, they will surely evolve; however, so will the attacks. 
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c. Summary of Risks Related to ML 
With the possibilities offered through poisoning and input attacks of tricking ML 
models into missing or failing to detect threats, the consequences can be catastrophic, 
especially in a military context. As several experiments have proven, even minute changes 
in the data used to train machines can render models totally unreliable.131 The need to 
ensure the integrity of algorithms and training data becomes clear; if there are any faults in 
the training data set, the interpretation of incoming data by the machine will be affected.132 
2. Ensuring Secure Military ML 
Since producing novel results unobtainable through human brain power is one of 
the obvious strengths of ML, paradoxically, this also seems to be one of the major 
weaknesses of ML. Even though there has been much development in the field of 
understanding how deep learning really works, there is still much left to understand, 
making attacks to the systems harder to re-trace and detect the point of failure.133 
Nevertheless, as most of the attacks just mentioned rely on knowledge of either the data 
sets or the algorithm used in the model, and even though “black-box” attacks are becoming 
more practical and frequent, limiting access to and information about the model used, 
seems crucial to ensure the integrity of the model. Furthermore, the need for quality 
assurance of both the algorithms and the training data is apparent.   
a. Secrecy 
With both poisoning and evasion attacks, the effect and possibilities to attack are 
closely related to the knowledge of the models. Even though direct access to or knowledge 
of a model is not required for all types of attacks, knowledge facilitates tailoring the attacks 
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and opens the way for more direct invasions into the integrity of the models employed.134 
Therefore, following the logic of security from obscurity, maintaining strict secrecy 
regarding the existence and features of the model’s algorithms and the data used for 
training should prevent some of the attacks.135 One example of this could be the use of 
secure enclaves to ensure data confidentiality, where the data can be monitored and only 
accessed by authorized personnel, as proposed in Stoica et al.’s paper “A Berkley View of 
Systems Challenges for AI” from 2017.136 On the other hand, since security through 
obscurity is highly contested as a method, security should not solely rely on obscurity but 
work as an extra layer in conjunction with other security measures.137 Therefore, given the 
military’s ability to classify sensitive information, and the array of possible attacks faced, 
limiting an adversary’s knowledge of models and data used seems to be a possible method 
to enhance security when paired with regular cybersecurity.  
b. Quality Assurance 
Traditionally, the data required for the initial learning has been provided by the 
organization producing the product, thereby ensuring the quality of the data used to train 
the model. However, increased demand for big data sets has led to cloud learning and data 
sharing becoming more common.138 Even though, as a thumb rule, a larger data set 
produces a more accurate model, this also increases the risk for manipulation.139 
Therefore, since poisoning and input attacks can occur during the later stages of learning 
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as well, the need to monitor and evaluate the data used for teaching the ML-models exists 
over time.140 
As the military increases its use of data in operations, it will face a greater need for 
quality assurance, thus increasing the need for qualified personnel.141 Even though there 
are a number of private companies engaged in quality assurance, due to the nature of 
military use of ML in warfare, this will require a military-specific perspective to allow for 
accountability and ethical use.142 Therefore, while many of these tasks can be performed 
by civilian contractors, there is a need to allow for adequate resources to be allocated to 
this perform task within the military organizations themselves. 
3. Best Practices 
As noted in the previous section, ML requires the need for assurance and trust in 
the supply chain, as well as an ability to certify and scrutinize the integrity of the products. 
The following paragraphs explore the ways and means to achieve the desired goals of 
developing and implementing robust systems, capable of adhering to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and accessibility demands of the military related to the posed threats. 
a. Ways 
Apart from the standard cyber protection put in place by nations around the world 
to keep the models and data used secure, secrecy seems to be the best way to further 
strengthen the security of military ML applications. As the Russian hack of the Ukraine 
Artillery application reported in 2016 blatantly showed, rushing unsecure products into use 
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might cause organizations considerable harm.143 Recognizing that cooperation with the 
commercial sector is required, however, three ways are suggested for maintaining secrecy. 
Own production: This is decidedly the best option, as control of the product is 
maintained from the idea stage, all the way to actual implementation. China has already 
started an ambitious program to heighten the expertise within its military, aiming to leave 
the rest of the world in its wake.144 Even though America is competitive now, China’s 
ability to leverage its state control of the commercial sector and academia might see 
America falling behind in the future.145 
While “in house” production might be the best way from a security standpoint, due 
to the inherent financial demands and know-how needed for this option, it seems unlikely 
that this approach is appropriate for other than the most affluent nations. In truth, even an 
AI superpower like the United States has problems to fill the knowledge gap within the 
military, as pointed out by the 2020 Solarium Commission report.146 
Close supervised cooperation with the commercial sector: Since most nations have 
special rules for government and military contracts, these contracts can enforce strict 
regulations on companies regarding the release of information. This practice is 
commonplace today and will probably be the standard procedure for ML products used by 
the military as well.147 Nonetheless, even if the companies provide the essential 
information for the ML algorithms and security for the data sets used in training, the need 
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for scrutiny of the effectiveness of the product still resides with the military, requiring 
educated personnel.148  
An example of this solution is the U.S. effort to incorporate AI full-motion video 
into drones, project MAVEN.149 Apart from the security aspects, where the military can 
have full control over the software, hardware, and training data, this approach also allows 
the military personnel involved to gain insights into and understanding of the product being 
produced.150 Working in close connection with trusted companies bound by secrecy 
agreements ensures product quality as well as limits knowledge of the products being 
developed. Even if there are a few projects implementing this approach, however, these 
tend to be both knowledge-intensive and costly.151 Furthermore, as it turned out in the case 
of project MAVEN, partnering with the military can raise ethical issues within the civilian 
sector that might impact the security of the project.152 
Commercial of the Shelf (COTS): Accepting that the commercial sector is at the 
forefront of development, one possibility for the military is to acquire already developed 
products from the commercial sector. Since a product has already been implemented in the 
civilian market, this can serve as a quality assurance factor, allowing the military to buy a 
mature and tested product. The benefits of buying an existing product are not only 
financial; it also reduces the need to incorporate an ample research and development 
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organization specifically aimed at ML.153 On the other hand, the organization’s insight 
into the model purchased and control of information might not be the same as if developed 
in close supervised cooperation with the company.154   
Even though several firms are making their products available for sale to the 
military, the potential risks of security breaches are evident. Merely the fact that the product 
is available on the market implies that all potential buyers will be able to acquire some 
insight into the product.155 To adopt this approach, the military must consider only 
trustworthy and well-documented companies. Furthermore, when employing a COTS 
product in a sensitive fashion, such as intelligence gathering, the military should also 
consider the risk of production breaches in security.156 Although a viable option, COTS 
products might be best implemented in less sensitive and demanding areas, where breaches 
in security might have lesser consequences.  
b. Means 
In order to achieve robust and resilient enough structures capable of ensuring the 
CIA triad, there is a need to create an organization capable of continuously evaluating data 
and algorithms. Two ways of strengthening the military’s position in ML are by creating 
institutions capable of conducting quality assurance and increasing the knowledge within 
the organization. 
Regulatory institutions: As previously stated by Akerlof, one way to limit the 
uncertainties in products is to create institutions.157 Considering the consequences of 
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buying an ML “lemon,” there is a vital need for regulation and scrutiny of ML models prior 
to the implementation into military applications. Since most countries already have 
organizations and regulations for cyber security, these organizations should also include 
branches dedicated to developing both national and international AI standards and ethical 
norms for the military to adhere to.158 
Furthermore, institutions charged with scrutinizing and regulating ML must have 
the proper knowledge to be able to make informed decisions.159 Therefore, it is not only 
imperative that the military are a part of these institutions and can offer their perspective, 
but also focus efforts on building their own institutions in order to provide proper guidance 
and expertise. 
Cooperative institutions: As previously mentioned, institutions able to draw 
expertise from both the military and civilian sector are much needed. In the United States, 
the construction of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) is a good example of 
institutionalizing collaboration between the military and the civilian sector.160 By not 
leveraging the knowledge of ML in the civilian sector and academia in a proper way, 
military organizations and schools utilizing and teaching AI run the risk of becoming 
obsolete and incapable of monitoring such systems. 
Creating institutions where the military and commercial sector interact not only 
leverages the knowledge base in a financially responsible way but also allows for the 
development of trust.161 Building on these foundations, perhaps the military can gradually 
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mitigate problems such as Google’s refusal to cooperate with the Department of Defense 
(DOD) in project MAVEN.162   
c. Goals 
Faced with the threats posed by AI-augmented attacks, the military needs to 
implement AI within defense. Paraphrasing John Arquilla’s statement: “It takes networks 
to fight networks,” the same seems to hold true for AI as well.163 Even though Symantec’s 
review of defense against cyber-attacks presents that a 100% success rate in the defense 
against ransomware attacks could be achieved when using a cloud-based ML platform, 
setting goals where all attacks can be averted could seem unrealistic.164 As new forms of 
defense are invented, inevitably, so are new methods of attack. It is more likely that 
organizations will have to focus on creating robust and resilient structures, based on a 
layered defense as described in the CSC report.165 In conjunction with a more layered 
defense strategy, militaries should also focus on setting achievable goals, in order to 
increase productivity and manage expectations. 
Although research has proven the benefits in effectiveness of setting both short- 
and long-term goals, policy and guidelines for AI are often too ambitious.166 As the RAND 
article “Pentagon’s Ambitious Vision and Strategy for AI Not Yet Backed by Sufficient 
Visibility or Resources” points out, the JAIC would be better off focusing on building a 
structure able to cope with contemporary problems rather than overshooting its 
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capacity.167 By setting achievable goals, not only can effectiveness in organizations be 
improved but expectation management can also be achieved.168  Therefore, in order to 
avoid dissonance, the available ways and means must correlate with the goals. Instead of 
striving for far-reaching goals, military institutions should focus on expectation 
management, providing the foundation for facilitating the implementation of AI. In a 
business where a mistake easily translates into loss of life, there is little room for wishful 
thinking or worrying about the consequence’s later type of mindset. 
4. Conclusion Analysis of Security 
Given the threats posed by poisoning and evasion attacks to AI, and ML-models in 
particular, the need for controlled implementation of ML into the military becomes 
apparent. Of course, the problems do not cease to exist once implemented but require 
competent supervision throughout its useful lifespan. By investing in institutions capable 
of evaluating and monitoring AI and leveraging existing protocols when working with the 
commercial sector, the military can achieve several benefits. First, an increased 
collaboration with academia and the private sector allows for trustworthy partners to be 
identified and a mutual understanding regarding the needs for security to develop. 
Regardless of the procurement method chosen, to highlight the need for secrecy when 
necessary, another layer of security can be added to ensure the integrity of sensitive data 
and algorithms used. Second, institutions do not only provide quality assurance but also 
the necessary platforms to deepen and develop knowledge sharing between different 
agencies and organizations. Thus, institutions and cooperative institutions, such as the 
JAIC and the CSC, improve the military’s ability to make informed decisions and decide 
on regulations. Lastly, by setting short term and achievable goals, it is possible to manage 
expectations effectively, and provide a foundation for acceptance of new technology into 
the military.  
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Although AI promises changes to society as a whole, it also promises to introduce 
challenges. Although many institutions and regulations do already exist within the 
overarching cybersecurity construct, there is a need to focus on the present problems, rather 
than assume that AI will change the world by itself. Given the potential impact of poisoning 
and evasion on ML-models working relatively autonomously in life-or-death situations, 
building trust in the public eye becomes imperative for a nation’s military. Lack of 
institutions assuring proper use and functionality of military AI, along with poor 
cooperation with the private sector and academia, might very well push a nation’s military 
to the sidelines in the AI-arms race. 
C. DATA  
According to Joint Intelligence Publication 2–0, “raw data by itself has relatively 
limited utility. However, when data is collected from a sensor and processed into an 
intelligible form, it becomes information and gains greater utility.”169 From an intelligence 
point of view, we can tell the data itself has limited value. It needs, therefore, examination 
within a broader scope and in conjunction with the information. Arguably, data has 
essential value within the context of AI since it is the initiator for the result. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Glossary of Terms 
provides several academic definitions of data. Still, the generalized definition is “data – 
characteristics of information, usually numerical, collected through observation.”170 It 
loops back to our earlier statement that data is a polymorphic problem. Whether or not the 
data collection is accomplished via observation, it is highly dependent on the system that 
is collecting it. 
The definition emphasizes both collection and numerical value. The latter becomes 
particularly relevant in AI if we examine the data from a computational core function, the 
binary code. Data is not a simple, standalone entity; it is a syntax of several complex or 
non-complex parts. Thus, a syntax explanation describes the function better than a semantic 
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definition. When the researchers Agnar Aamodt and Mads Nygård refer to data and its 
syntax, they explain the following: “data are syntactic entities. Data are patterns with no 
meaning; they are input to an interpretation process, i.e., to the initial step of decision 
making.”171 They simplify the model by explaining an input [environment] – decision step 
– output [environment] model. Their foundation for this model is the use of data in a 
decision-making process. By explaining data from a syntactic perspective rather than a 
semantic view, we generate an understanding of data’s place in AI. The decision step 
within the model can be replaced with a black box, or a CPU processor, or an AI function. 
Whatever the preferred option, there is still an input of data and an output of something.  
Aamodt and Nygård leave one more challenge for us to explain—the environment. 
If one derives data from the environment, how can we explain that? The setting is all the 
things or possible things in one’s surroundings that could produce data inputs. Thus, it is 
probably more valid to discuss what types of collectors of data there are, rather than explain 
all the things surrounding us. Data inputs can be collected from the environment by 
different sources, such as observations, surveys, interviews, polls, reports, optical means, 
and other data sources. Almost everything one can observe, hear, smell, or feel can with 
different methods translate into data. 
Rama Vedashree, the CEO of the Data Security Council of India, explains the 
importance of data in the article “How Data Grids Will Power the Economy and Influence 
Our Future.” According to Vedashree, “data is more than seemingly random collections of 
ones and zeros. It is information, currency, social fabric, safety, knowledge, confidence, 
and innovation.”172 In light of the broad explanation of data given by Rama Vedashree, 
the syntax of how it all connects in the digital world becomes more apparent. That also 
implies the necessity of categorizing data to meet its different demands better. On the other 
hand, it is not necessary or sufficient to divide data for AI into primary and secondary 
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data.173 Data is also, arguably by many, becoming a strategic resource or value. Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt expand on the subject by stating, “information is becoming a strategic 
resource that may prove as valuable and influential in the post-industrial era as capital and 
labor have been in the industrial age.”174 Once again, we note the importance of both 
monetary value and computing value for decision making that data and information bring. 
1. Types of Data 
Tom Taulli expands on the subject and clarifies where data emerges and what types 
of data there are, concluding that data can come from various sources such as the web/ 
social media, biometric data, point of sale systems, the internet of things, cloud systems, 
and corporate databases.175 And, because different types of data demand different kinds 
of structures, Taulli suggests four ways to organize data: structured data, unstructured data, 
semi-structured data, and time-series data.176  
a. Structured Data 
Structured data, often formatted in Excel files and Structured Query Language 
(SQL) databases, includes lists of phone numbers, social security numbers, and other 
financial information.177 Relational databases or spreadsheets are some further examples 
of structured data formats.178 Due to its structured and organized nature, Daniel Nelson 
argues that structured data lends itself to training AI, referred to as supervised learning.179  
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b. Unstructured Data 
Unstructured data represents about 80% of all the data on the internet, making it a 
source for feeding an AI system. There is no defined relationship between the data points, 
and they reside in a data lake or a large pool of unstructured data. Taulli mentions NoSQL 
databases as the next-generation tool to hold this type of data. Examples of unstructured 
data include images, videos, and social media information.180  
c. Semi-structured Data 
Semi-structured data is a hybrid consisting of structured and unstructured data, 
according to Taulli. Data of this kind includes Extensible Markup Language (XML) files 
and JavaScripts Object Notation (JSON), and CSV files, or Application Programming 
Interfaces (API).181 
d. Time-Series Data 
Time-series data, as the name indicates, is data ordered in time. It can be structured 
or unstructured.182 Taulli explains it as pieces of information about interactions utilized to 
track a customer journey. As he stated, “When a user goes to a website, uses an app, or 
even walks in a store.”183   
2. Data and AI 
When attempting to define data, it seems more prudent to utilize a syntax 
explanation rather than the semantic meaning. Thus, data represents the input of something 
(points of information) into a computational system (the specific function of the AI 
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capacity), generating a predetermined output based on the data input and the computational 
calculations within the AI function. Data quantity, quality, and representativeness are 
therefore essential to a customer of an AI function.184 There are some challenges with data 
that we need to address to understand the problems it could cause. As a customer, one must 
define the data to which an AI system should have access. One should assess whether the 
information is structured, unstructured, or semi-structured because that will affect the 
decision of a specific AI function. Furthermore, several reports and articles suggest a 
problem with biases, such as sexism and racism. James Zou and Londa Schiebinger write 
in one of their articles that “a major driver of data biases in AI is in the training data.”185 
This implies that if an AI system or function trains on the wrong sets of data, there can be 
consequences. Lastly, as data has become a valuable commodity, the question of cost must 
be addressed. 
a. Biases 
Biases can occur both in models and in data; while this section only focuses on 
data, one should be aware that biases can occur on several occasions within an AI system. 
The challenge as well as the solution to the problem is how and where the collection of 
data takes place. If, as suggested by Zou and Schiebinger, training data gets scraped from 
the internet, including Google images and Google News, the collected data sets come from 
what is most popular on those websites at that particular time. Furthermore, that method, 
as Zou and Schiebinger highlight, “could unintentionally produce data that encode gender, 
ethnic and cultural biases.”186 ImageNet, for example, provides datasets for many machine 
learning systems to learn and train on to function. It is one of the world’s largest producers 
of imagery for training sets.187 The dataset connects to WordNet, a database that provides 
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synonyms, constituted by several words or phrases. Each synonym set has thousands of 
pictures associated with it to describe the word. All the over 14 million images on ImageNet 
have been tagged and categorized by Amazon Mechanical Turk, a crowdsourcing 
project.188  Here Zou and Schiebinger point to a statistical problem 45% of ImageNet’s 
pictures stemming from the United States. However, the United States is only home to 4% 
of the world’s population.189 That points to a possible bias when the selection is mainly 
from the United States. How will that affect overseas usage? The tendencies in this 
particular example are known, and its potential biases are known. 
With the awareness that data can be biased, one solution often offered is to keep 
humans in the loop as a controller. However, humans too have biases. Therefore, since 
both data and humans might create or imply bias in an AI algorithm, perhaps as David 
Danks—a renowned researcher within the field of ethics—suggests, the focus should be 
on biases that cause harm.190  Accepting and understanding that biases exist within data, 
our first step is to identify and mitigate potential problems. The best solution to the 
problem, then, is to educate and build awareness within organizations utilizing AI, while 
continuously monitoring and re-assessing algorithms in order to identify shortfalls. 
b. Access 
Implementing an AI solution implies that some data will have to be assessed or 
examined by the function. Earlier, we mentioned that data could come in several forms, at 
rest, in process, or in transit: all of these demands’ thoughtful consideration. The previous 
discussion also assumes that one has access to data. To further explore the information for 
use as an input to an AI function, it is essential to categorize the data. Taulli utilizes three 
standard bins to do that: in-house data, open-source data, and third-party data.191 In-house 
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data emerges from the sensors at the user’s disposal. Open-source data is the type of 
information one can collect and access from other sources, open to all over the internet or 
different networks. Third-party data is points of information a user buys from a company 
or enterprise. An example could be to purchase data from Facebook, Google, or similar 
enterprises. The next step is to define how to store the data at rest.  
Regardless of how access to data is acquired, all data collected still needs to be 
assessed, evaluated, and stored, requiring a sufficient infrastructure at the end user. 
Furthermore, when handling data for a military purpose, security may bring further 
limitations. It could mean that a COTS option or cloud storage is not viable. Hence, the 
need for trustworthy sources of data and in-house ability to maintain the security of and 
assure the integrity of the data used, collected, and disseminated is essential.  
c. Cost  
Our findings of calculations of costs are based on Amit Kumar Dutta and Ragib 
Hasan’s research paper, “How Much Does Storage Really Cost? Towards a Full Cost 
Accounting Model for Data Storage,” and another by D. Sculley et al., “Hidden Technical 
Debt in Machine Learning Systems.” The two papers take different approaches to 
calculating costs; Dutta and Hasan propose a more traditional model, while Sculley et al. 
propose a set of questions to ask when trying to estimate the specific costs of implementing 
an ML functionality. Dutta and Hasan have assessed and mathematically modeled the cost 
in their research on the topic.192 They suggest a full cost accounting approach to develop 
a realistic model of the actual price. The model that Dutta and Hasan present includes direct 
private costs, indirect personal costs, and social and environmental costs.193 Some of the 
factors that need consideration are the following: initial value, floor rent, energy, service, 
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disposal cost, and environmental costs, to mention a few, as per the authors’ suggestion.194 
The cost model to account for the total cost would be the following: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
+ 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇195 
In addition to these costs, military units may face organizational changes to meet 
new demands. In the end, the ability to provide the necessary infrastructure will always 
determine whether AI is a plausible solution. Failure to accommodate adequate security, 
maintenance, and assessment exposes the system to adversarial attacks and potential 
degradation of efficiency. An additional point to the total costs of ML is made in the article 
“Hidden Technical Debt in Machine Learning Systems.” In contrast, the authors argue that 
there are several initially hidden costs with managing machine learning systems. The 
authors know, since all of them are long time employees within Google Inc.196 The authors 
mention an article from Ward Cunningham in 1992 that uses the term technical debt. In 
short, calculations of the costs when moving fast into new software engineering risks 
missing out on the long-term costs that a quick move can bring. An exciting discussion 
arises about the encapsulation of data or the system. We earlier mentioned that AI systems 
depend on data, internal or external, which brings us to the conclusion that it is difficult or 
nearly impossible to encapsulate a larger ML system if one wants it to work at its full 
potential. Scully et al. named this the erosion of boundaries.197 Eroded boundaries occur 
because models in ML AI systems are interchangeable, and to seek a solution to one 
problem could introduce another problem or opportunity. As we have earlier said, one way 
of accessing data to fuel the function within the technological operation is by buying data. 
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Scully et al. call this data dependency,198 which also creates complexity when calculating 
an AI functionality’s costs. According to Sculley et al., the precise cost assessment is hard 
to estimate and demands a holistic view of the system. A human-centric approach that asks 
the following questions could then provide a supportive contribution to Dutta and Hasan’s 
costs. Suggested questions, according to Scully et al., are:  
• How easily can an entirely new algorithmic approach be tested at full 
scale? 
• What is the transitive closure of all data dependencies? 
• How precisely can the impact of a new change to the system be 
measured? 
• Does improving one model or signal degrade others? 
• How quickly can new members of the team be brought up to speed?199 
When pursuing the introduction of AI functionality into the organization, it is 
necessary to make several calculations and estimates to assess the actual cost. And, because 
those calculations are challenging to carry out effectively, we recommend that individuals 
with specific knowledge be brought onto the acquisition team for this purpose.  
3. Conclusion Analysis of Data 
Before the decision is made to implement AI functions within an organization, 
decision makers must consider several issues, revealing one of the core challenges with 
data; it cannot be examined and judged as a single problem, but must be viewed as a part 
of the AI discussion as a whole. Thus, it has the similarities of a wicked problem, since the 
function or the outcome of an AI capability is dependent on the type of data used to train, 
feed, and mine it with. Therefore, as soon as AI presents an option to solve a problem, the 
complications that data mining, storage, and access associated with the solution present 
must be considered. Lack of sufficient infrastructure, knowledge, or possibilities to acquire 
and examine data might put an end to the project, as well as harm an organization’s 
credibility. 
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Since understanding and identifying the potential pitfalls related to data is 
paramount, educated personnel are vital to examining and scrutinizing the process. In order 
to mitigate these problems, education, trustworthy sources for data, and reliable checks and 
balances must be used. These considerations hold true for all aspects of AI, and cannot be 
neglected at any time; rather, these should provide the foundation for all AI discussions 
within an organization and be weighed against current monetary limitations.  
D. INTERVIEWS 
The interviews for our research were conducted with persons within the academic, 
business, and military sectors. All the interviewed persons were chosen for their knowledge 
within the field of AI and their differing perspectives on the use of AI in military 
applications, as described in Appendix B. By contrasting the different drivers of 
development of AI through their respective positions, the intent was twofold; identify the 
validity of transparency, security, and data as considerations for acquiring AI, as identified 
in the SDRA document “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military 
Applications.” Furthermore, the aim was to examine whether there were other aspects that 
were reoccurring and might be incorporated to enhance the current model, adapting it to 
the specifics of SOF procurement. 
1. Findings 
All interviewed persons acknowledge the previous mentioned pillars of 
transparency, security, and data as a sound foundation for the application of AI into an 
existing organization. Some aspects touched upon were more specific to smaller 
organizations and were therefore particularly interesting for this research. The reoccurring 
themes were those of speed, flexibility, and front-end vs. back-end usage of AI. During the 
interviews, cost was never addressed as a problem and none of the interviewed individuals 
brought up price as a go- or no-go criterion. Perhaps this is because the interviews focused 
on U.S. individuals and personnel, who are accustomed to the U.S. defense budget, which 
in 2019 accounted for 38% of the entire world’s total military spending according to the 
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).200 In the case of a smaller 
country with limited resources, cost must be considered, regardless of whether the goal 
sometimes might justify any means.  
a. Speed 
The general opinion during the interviews was that the primary gain of introducing 
AI into an organization is that processes can be sped up, thereby shortening the decision 
cycle. At the same time, with this speed comes an inherent need to know what the AI is 
capable of, and what the aim of acquiring a specific system is. Furthermore, one of the 
interviewed subjects expressed that the speed of decision making, enhanced by AI, will 
eventually only be hampered by the humans.201 Therefore, there is a risk that AI will be 
called upon not only to analyze but also make decisions in order to outperform an 
adversary. If this becomes a reality, there is an apparent risk that humans lose control over 
the systems, actively losing accountability for the decisions taken during a war.202 With 
this in mind, several of the subjects expressed concerns that many organizations currently 
are buying into AI enhanced products without the proper knowledge of the limitations and 
capacities of the systems.203 Hence, all AI procurements must be based on educated 
decisions, clearly understanding the implications of incorporating AI systems into 
organizations. 
In order to manage the speed offered through AI enhancement, there is a need to 
educate users of the potential shortfalls and gains offered. Allowing AI to make decisions 
just to increase performance might seem like a good solution; however, there must always 
be a system of checks and balances in place to mitigate potentially dangerous outcomes of 
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the systems.204 As AI is a field still under development and constantly promising new 
implementations, it might also grow outside its originally intended boundaries as new 
functions are developed. Especially the dangers of bias in the training and learning of an 
AI system were highlighted more than once in the interviews.205 Nevertheless, the benefit 
of using AI will always transcend the potential shortcomings, and using it for a specific 
purpose and maintaining humans in the loop can mitigate most of these problems. In the 
current situation on the modern battlefield, as long as AI lacks some aspects of human 
decision-making capability based on the information received, there will probably remain 
a need for a human in the loop. 
b. Flexibility 
One of the clearest points made during the interviews was one of flexibility; that is, 
the need for organizations to be able to quickly adapt to, incorporate, and understand AI in 
order to truly reap the benefits in the future.206 Maintaining an edge on the enemy, 
however, requires more than just “getting the right stuff.” It requires a chain where 
procurement decisions are based on knowledge about current systems, well thought 
through use, and capable operators of the equipment. As mentioned previously regarding 
the need for understanding, the whole chain within an organization must be equipped to 
trust, understand, and utilize the products for their intended purposes to be effective. 
Furthermore, organizations must take the emergence of AI seriously, developing protocols 
and procedures to speed up the process of certifying the use of new technology.207 
With a constantly developing and lucid field such as AI, procurement processes 
must adapt to the increasing speed of development. Five-year procurement plans might 
work for huge systems, such as replacing an entire network; however, as recent fighting in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region suggests, failing to incorporate new technology at the right 
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time might turn out to be very costly.208 Therefore, when it comes to procuring AI, flexible 
procurement procedures in the SOF community lend themselves well to maintaining an 
edge on the enemy. By contrast, the lack of knowledge within organizations must be 
addressed at all levels through building networks where the full potential of the defense 
industry, private industry, and academia can be put to full use.209 Given the constant 
developments within the field, it is hardly possible for a single organization to maintain a 
working knowledge regarding current developments. Expanding the network outside the 
defense industry, such as the efforts within NATO’s invention program, will also allow for 
the necessary trust to be built between organizations.210 
c. Front-end vs. Back-end AI 
There are certain distinctions between the different AI products produced and used 
for military applications that were highlighted during the interviews. The main differences 
mentioned were what amount of data the model requires and how it learns. Most decision 
enhancing models, based on analyzing and comparing data, require huge amounts of data 
and interconnected networks to produce the best outcome. These systems often “learn on 
the job,” requiring scrutiny of incoming data and recertification of the model.211 
Contrasting this, there are several systems based on a small learning database employed to 
perform a certain task, such as surveillance systems augmented by shape recognition AI, 
which uses a controlled data set to learn to recognize and categorize different shapes prior 
to deployment. Once in use, these models work on the already trained data and do not learn 
on the job.212 A suggested way to differentiate between these different AI models might 
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be to label the data heavy and learning models as “back-end” products—since they require 
large infrastructure both in regard to the amounts of data as well as support and 
monitoring—whilst the more field adapted products that are trained once on a limited data 
set are labeled “front-end” products. 
A division between front-end and back-end products and concepts can be found in 
a multitude of disciplines, such as management, innovation, and computer science. 
Although no previous division of military front-end and back-end AI exists to the authors’ 
knowledge, the proposed division builds on a mixture of interpretations of management 
philosophy and innovation theory. In management, the division of front-end and back-end 
activities often focuses on efficiency gains by separating high consumer contact (front-end) 
activities—requiring close contact with customers—from less consumer intense (back-
end) activities aimed at maximizing efficiency of the organization.213 Another 
interpretation is offered by James P. Ignizio in the foreword to Adolfo Crespo Márquez’s 
book “Dynamic Modeling for Supply Chain Management: Dealing With Front-end, Back-
end, and Integration Issues”:  
The front end addresses those portions of the organisation and its business 
processes that deal with sales and marketing, organised according to 
customer type. The back end portion of the model encompasses the units 
that deal with research, development, and the methods and processes of 
manufacturing.214  
In the case of military AI, front-end solutions can then be understood as systems 
incorporating AI that task are oriented and can be controlled, understood, and evaluated by 
an end-user without a large support infrastructure. Conversely, back-end AI are products 
that require large support structures, research, are less visible to the end-users, and might 
imply potential structural changes affecting an organization. 
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According to this perspective, the front-end solutions are what is visible to the 
client, or in a military context, the user. This also allows the front-end concept to imply the 
interpretation regarding front-end innovations suggested in the paper “From Preliminary 
Ideas to Corroborated Product Definitions: Managing the Front End of New Product 
Development,” published in the California Management Review: “The front end can be 
understood as three key activities: idea and concept development, idea and concept 
alignment, and idea and concept legitimization.”215 Hence, the concept of front-end 
military AI lends itself well to the SOF mindset of rapid testing and concept development. 
Back-end products, on the other hand, might be more suitable for use within larger 
organizations—since operating, maintaining, and updating them usually involves a higher 
economic cost and need for highly skilled personnel within the organization. However, 
since these types of systems, once implemented, will be used for a foreseeable future, the 
effects of a breach in security can have more long-term strategical effects. In turn, this 
emphasizes the need for long-term planning, research, and careful consideration prior to 
procurement of back-end AI products. In contrast, the front-end products can rely on data 
and models that can be physically monitored by the users, lowering the requirements for a 
larger security infrastructure while the products are in use. Since the aim of a front-end AI 
product is to speed up more time critical tasks, which are constantly evolving and changing 
by their nature, one factor of these products should be that the risk of a breach in security 
would only cause tactical effects. Hence, the risk mitigation considerations should factor 
in whether an AI application falls under the front-end or back-end category of AI. To 
simplify, if the data used and gathered can be physically owned and controlled by 
individual operators while in use, and the loss of data or AI model would only produce 
effects at the tactical level, this should indicate that the product is to be considered as a 
front-end application. Hence, front-end products should not require an organization to 
maintain them, but rather be considered as more or less COTS products, where a company 
delivers a product that is ready to use with minimal training.  
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Given the changing nature of missions and relative lack of infrastructure of SOF, 
front-end AI should provide a more relevant focus for the organization seeking to maintain 
an edge on the battlefield. Since these systems are easier to maintain and might even be 
bespoke for certain missions, the need for rapid procurement seems more necessary. The 
rapid procurement chains of the SOF should provide the necessary flexibility to keep up 
with development. In contrast, back-end applications are constantly learning—relying on 
masses of data that needs to be monitored and evaluated by trained technicians—and the 
security of such products can have strategical consequences, making a larger organization 
more suitable to acquire and maintain them. Specializing on a certain type of system could 
also prove beneficial for division of labor between the regular forces and SOF, leading to 
synergy between the two as one can benefit of the developments of the other. 
E. CONCLUSION OF ANALYSIS 
Every military has its own acquisition evaluation matrices. Nonetheless, when it 
comes to incorporating AI, lengthy processes and lack of knowledge, might result in missed 
opportunities in the battlefield.216 Although it is true that security concerns on a strategical 
level require all the preparation and precautions necessary to safeguard vital information 
and people, most militaries around the world currently lack educated personnel with the 
required skills to assess AI; there must be other ways to move forward. 
As discussed in the previous chapters about trust and AI, it is not only transparency 
that can mitigate trust issues related to AI, but equally important is the human trust between 
persons and a product’s ability to perform its given task. Hence, when procuring front-end 
products for applications in the field, the need for trust in the provider of the product will 
often be more important, especially in the cases where the organization itself will not own 
the actual data used to train the models. Unless an organization has the economic 
wherewithal to augment its resources and constantly attract the most skilled personnel in 
the field of AI, is the organization has only two options to move forward: use trustworthy 
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suppliers that adhere to present military standards, regulations, and security requirements 
or get left behind on the AI battlefield. To maintain a forward momentum in the 
procurement of AI, the military cannot merely seek to reproduce the knowledge that is 
available in academia and private enterprises. Instead, the military must create reliable 
networks, such as the NATO Innovation Hub initiative, that can assist in the innovation 
and implementation of AI into the organization.217 This is especially true for SOF, since 
available manpower and funding are often limited within such organizations.  
When it comes to acquisition, AI should not be treated much differently from other 
hardware. First, a problem that needs to be solved should be identified, before even 
considering a purchase. Second, every plausible solution should be considered and 
evaluated before deciding that AI must be involved. Lastly, the economic consequences 
must always have the last say before a new system is decided upon. There is a parenthesis 
to the problem statement; sometimes, a community or organization needs to be presented 
with an opportunity to realize they have a problem. However, the common and preferred 
way should be to identify the problem or the concern to be solved. If the best solution 
involves AI, there should be a model for evaluating the potential for a successful 
implementation of a system within the organization. While the NATO model provides an 
excellent foundation for considerations regarding military applications for AI, when 
adapting it to SOF-specific considerations two additional pillars are suggested based on the 
analysis: Application and Risk. 
a. Application 
The previous front-end vs. back-end discussion, including the implications for 
where and how AI is intended to be used, can guide the considerations for the need for data, 
security, and transparency. Answering these questions will give an idea of whether the 
acquisition will entail a lengthy process of coordination with other agencies or if there is a 
need for further ethical discussions before implementing the product.  
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• Where the product is intended to be employed physically will have 
consequences for the type of security needed, both concerning the physical 
product as well as for the data used; how might the AI model and data be 
exposed to adversaries? 
• How the model is used indicates the need for ethical considerations and 
training needed for the operators based on whether there will be a human 
in the loop or if the product is intended to operate autonomously. 
If the risks associated with where the model is employed can be mitigated, and the 
ethical and educational requirements of the how factor are known and acceptable, then, 
there should be no real hindrance as to why the product should not be treated as any other 
COTS system. Although there is often talk about bias in algorithms, it is only an issue if 
the algorithm has been programmed to behave in a particular way—that is, the designer 
has projected his or her bias, or the data used for training is faulty or biased in its 
composition—rather than any inherent bias in algorithms themselves.218 Therefore, by 
using trusted manufacturers, voicing these concerns during the development of products, 
and scrutinizing the data used for training, organizations can address much of the ethical 
issues before implementation.219 Furthermore, as argued by several scholars; as long as 
there is a human in the loop, the system itself can hardly be blamed for any action it 
suggests.220 Awareness of the potential problem with biases will also create sufficient 
knowledge of the problem within the community; after all, biases could potentially exist in 
different forms in many acquisitions and implementations.  
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Even though security of information has already been mentioned as a part of the 
concept, mission security adds a new dimension to considerations regarding AI. Since 
some systems incorporate the AI algorithm in the physical product—as in the case of the 
assassination of the Iranian nuclear scientist, which sparked speculations that a facial 
recognition algorithm was used to identify the target—protecting the product might require 
certain restrictions to implementation.221 Although a loss of an algorithm or model might 
not impede the success of the current mission, it might turn out to be problematic if the 
same solution is to be used again. As previously stated, if the algorithm is known it becomes 
easier to manipulate and exploit its weaknesses. Therefore, especially when considering 
the use of front-end AI, the organization must establish protocols and procedures to 
mitigate potential information loss. 
Although AI can support a mission, it can also cause severe harm to the 
organization if not properly managed.222 If data and algorithms are stored in a place that 
the enemies have access to, there is always a possibility that the tactics, technology, and 
knowledge of a target can be compromised. Therefore, limiting the use of sensitive systems 
to smaller and specialized units such as SOF, where security can be monitored and 
guaranteed, seems preferable. Yet, even if the SOF community would serve well as a 
platform to test, evaluate, and develop procedures for mitigating the risks before a large-
scale implementation of front-end AI is implemented, if the risk to mission is deemed too 
great, other options must be considered. Hence, Risk, as in long-term risk to mission, should 
be a factor to consider in the early stages of procurement, along with other security issues 
connected to AI. 
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The interviews conducted for this research not only cemented the previous factors 
of Transparency, Security, and Data as a foundation for considerations when incorporating 
AI into the military, but also added several insights for enhancing the model for application 
within the SOF community. The inherent flexibility in procurement available for many 
SOF provides the foundation for a divide in focus between the usually more rigid regular 
army and the SOF. As the author David Egerton explains in his book The Shock of The 
Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900, “although we can stop projects, it is often 
said that we cannot uninvent technologies, usually meaning we cannot get rid of them,” 
implying that we need to move forward into a future that incorporates the technology 
whether we like it or not.223 While AI most likely will be incorporated throughout most 
organizations in the foreseeable future, the flexibility needed to remain in the front-line of 
development must be ensured within the SOF community, leading the way in more field-
oriented applications where the need for infrastructure is not as great. Connected to the 
need to utilize the current developments in an ethical and an orderly fashion, it is apparent 
that organizations must develop networks capable of providing both trustworthy products 
and the required knowledge. Developing networks, such as the JAIC’s project Tradewind, 
which spans the military, private, and the academic sectors, is required to maintain an edge 
within the field, since they all interact to reshape the current battlefield.224 
Focusing on front-end applications allows for a more rapid incorporation and use 
of systems and reduces the security considerations related to more data heavy applications. 
Furthermore, even though front-end applications mitigate many of the long-term support 
and maintenance issues, the mere fact that operators use and encounter AI on a regular 
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basis will most likely help build trust in the systems that work, while other systems can be 
evaluated and sent back to the drawing board.225 Building this trust and knowledge in 
products, manufacturers, and the technology should surely benefit the entire armed forces 
in the end. Regardless, since technology can decide the outcome on the battlefield in 
today’s modern war, a testbed for emerging and existing technology must exist within 
every modern army. SOF, through its culture and small scale, has traditionally provided 
this testbed for other military hardware, such as weapons, communications, and tactics. 
Given the wide and undefined nature of AI, at the end of the day, there is nothing to prevent 
much of what is labeled AI to be part of this. In addition, borrowing from the “lean start 
up” community, we suggest that it is important to start small and be prepared to scale or 
fail fast and then move on.226 Hence, it is important to start with some AI functionality 
now, rather than wait for the perfect solution or ending up in a large and time-consuming 
procurement process. 
Admittedly, unproven technology might pose risk to mission, and that risk should 
be addressed through continued testing, evaluating, and disseminating lessons learned. 
However, with the current development within the field of AI, armies cannot afford the 
luxury of long-term evaluation processes before tapping the perceived benefits of simple 
products that are readily available to the public. Instead, tests, implementation, and 
evaluation must be considered as a continuous process. Since this has been a hallmark of 
SOF in the past, and considering the ambiguity of the concept of AI and the continuously 
evolving tasks of SOF, there seems to be little to hinder the future use of SOF as a testbed 
in this area as well.227 While some systems might prove likely to endanger the integrity of 
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an entire country, there are several instances where these risks can be considered local and 
outweighed by the potential benefits versus the risks of not applying AI as a solution. With 
this in mind, we advance a simple model to evaluate whether the proposed technology is 
suitable for rapid test and development, or if a more comprehensive analysis is needed. 
A. PROPOSED MODEL  
As a result of our research, building on the pillars of transparency, security and 
data, we propose a model for organizations to use when aiming to acquire AI technology. 
Its intention is to support decision makers in assessing common factors. In addition to the 
three earlier mentioned criteria, our findings suggest adding risk and application as primary 
considerations, along with the front-end/back-end technologies construct for cooperative 
considerations between conventional forces and SOF. Following the assessment of the 
parameters in the tentative model, the proposed model provides a broad foundation for 
considerations before acquiring and adopting AI into military organizations. Although the 
model is intended as a model for determining the suitability for rapid implementation and 
testing of systems within the SOF structure, it is generic in its nature and would serve as 
an AI acquisition evaluation tool for organizations of any size or military affiliation. 




Figure 1. Proposed Model for Analysis 
Risk — Since AI in its current applications seldom appears as a single entity, but 
rather as incorporated into existing systems and machines to enhance capabilities and speed 
up processes, it is more important to focus on the products’ combined features than on the 
specifics of a particular AI-model. In many cases, AI need not be treated as something that 
always requires special attention, considering that facial recognition, pattern analysis, and 
self-driving cars exist, and the technology has existed for quite some time. When AI 
proposes to fundamentally change the decision process or actively make changes to the 
information provided for decision makers, however, a larger, more holistic approach is 
required. Hence, looking at the potential risks of the proposed solution in a suitable context, 
while acknowledging the aspect of AI as a facilitator for the solution, it is possible to avoid 
unnecessary considerations that might end up slowing down procurement. Suggested 
parameters for selection could be as simple as: 
• Mission, Tactical, or Strategic: Will the loss of data or algorithm inflict 
irreparable damage, or will the damage be of a negligible character? 
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• Life, System, or Product: Will a malfunction of the AI component cause 
bodily harm, disruption of a larger dependent system, or simply lower 
trust in the product? 
• Autonomous, Controlled, or Supporting: How will the AI component 
affect decision making; will action be autonomous, controlled by a human, 
or only used to support human decision making? 
If the answers to these questions are acceptable, can be mitigated, and controlled 
locally, just as for any other equipment, there should be little reason as to why AI-driven 
solutions could not be implemented as well. Although these parameters are only 
suggestions, and organizations will surely adapt their own framework of risk assessment, 
they can provide a quick way to assess whether the product poses an acceptable risk for 
quick implementation, or if a more thorough assessment and procurement procedure is 
needed. 
Application — Depending on how the product is configured and its intended use, 
the application of the product will indicate if it is suitable for rapid acquisition or requires 
a larger support structure to perform the expected tasks. While there are many factors to 
consider, the main issues center around the need for training, physical configuration of the 
product, and where it needs to be deployed. In a similar fashion as the proposed risk 
assessment, a few simple questions can be applied to determine whether the product can 
be tried, tested, and assessed within the organization. Suggested parameters could be: 
• Plug and Play, Organizational Support, or Outside Expertise:  What kind 
of expertise is needed to operate the product? Will a single untrained 
operator be able to use and maintain the product or does it require the 
support from existing experts within or outside the organization? 
• Standalone, Integrated, or Foundational: What kind of effects will the 
product have on other parts of the organization? Is the product intended to 
work as a separate entity, be integrated as a part of an existing system, or 
even provide the foundation for a new system? 
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• High Risk, Controlled, or Secure: Where will the product be applied? Will 
the product be deployed unsupervised in the field, in a controlled office 
environment, or implemented in a setting where a high level of security is, 
or can be, maintained.  
Considering which other systems are affected by the application, it is crucial to 
determine the overall effects of the implementation. Determining the second and third order 
effects of the system will give guidance as to whether the product is to be considered a 
front- or back-end AI implementation. If the solution is provided by a trustworthy source, 
the data used is controlled and confined to the organization, and there is little or no need 
for expert maintenance, it is likely that the system can be considered a front-end solution.  
The combined results of the initial analyses of the risks and the proposed 
application, as well as the resulting implications of implementing a specific AI-system, 
will help decide the remaining questions related to the need for transparency, security, and 
data. Furthermore, the result should also give an indication in an early stage whether the 
product is suitable for SOF-specific acquisition or if a more formal process is needed.  
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
As has previously been discussed, there is no real consensus on what AI entails; 
therefore, it is unnecessary for organizations to fear implementing a product, just because 
it contains an AI element. Instead, what becomes interesting is what the product proposes 
to solve, how it solves the problem, and what implications this has for the product’s 
usability in a certain application. By expanding the previously proposed existing 
parameters for evaluation of AI in the military context—data, transparency, and security—
along with risk and application considerations, the model proposes a simple tool for initial 
analysis for SOF AI procurement. Although there is little novel in doing a quick mission 
or risk analysis before implementing a product, the novelty in the proposed method consists 
of looking at AI as a system of systems instead of focusing on the possible dilemmas 
implied simply by the name AI. Paradoxically, looking beyond the current discussion of 





Support from the empirical studies and interviews used in this research suggests 
that it is more important for SOF to invest in available front-end AI systems today, rather 
than more extensive and complex back-end solutions tomorrow. Since many intricate 
functions and designs are available on the market today, speed in acquisitions is vital to 
develop an organization’s understanding of how and what AI can bring to the future 
battlefield. Although there are certain risks and ethical considerations associated with 
adopting any new inventions, many potential pitfalls can be mitigated through simple 
measures such as maintaining a mechanism that allows for human intervention or for 
working with trustworthy partners. Only through constant exposure, development, 
adaptation, and experimentation will an organization be able to maintain the edge in AI 
tomorrow. Instead of focusing on the term AI itself, as with all future acquisitions, 
organizations need to focus on the problem or system that needs to be addressed and apply 
the best solution available to solve it. Realizing that the main benefits of AI functions are 
improved efficiencies in an organization, rather than a silver bullet to eliminate all 
challenges faced by the organization, is a good starting point. Based on the conducted 
research, the proposed model offers a suggested framework of considerations to be 
incorporated into the regular decision-making process and procurement process. 
Additionally, three guidelines related to SOF acquiring and implementing an AI 
functionality can be discerned; the need to assess organizational capability, focus on front-
end solutions, and manage expectations.  
First, assessing organizational capability is critical to make sure that the proposed 
solution will render the desired effects. When conducting the assessment, it is essential to 
address the question of capability; does the organization have the necessary knowledge to 
run and maintain an AI functionality, or what is needed to acquire these critical 
capabilities? By applying the proposed model, an organization should be able to rapidly 
determine whether outside support or new skills are needed to implement a solution. 
Although knowledge and skill are vital to address the issue of adopting AI, these skills take 
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a long time to acquire and maintain. Therefore, a smaller organization should focus on its 
strengths, which in the case of SOF is the faster acquisition process rather than a high 
degree of technical expertise. For more complicated applications, the SOF will likely need 
to collaborate with organizations capable of educating proficient AI professionals. By 
determining the problem to be solved and applying the model, if the suggested solution 
contains an AI element, the organization should quickly realize if the capacity exists within 
the organization to implement the suggested solution or if outside support is needed.  
Second, a front-end focus is also essential. Starting with a front-end solution will 
enable a quicker acquisition process, and the investment cost will likely be lower. The risk 
of creating an economic black hole might be mitigated by promoting the benefit of gaining 
a first understanding of the technology. An early adoption within the organization might 
not only give an edge to the organization but also act to increase trust in future AI solutions. 
As recommended within the lean start-up industry, start small and scale, or in other words, 
fail fast to get organizational understanding. Remember, AI is software, and all software 
can in some way be upgraded as technology progresses and user development continues. 
To reduce the risk posed by the technology, it might be desirable to field test products in a 
less contested environment, such as counterterrorism operations, that is closely associated 
with SOF operations. However, once the proper understanding of possible security 
concerns has been established and tested, the knowledge acquired can be used to gain an 
edge against a more conventional adversarial competitor.  
The third factor is managing expectations. AI can, and will, bring drastic change 
within society and the future battlefield. Nonetheless, here and now, AI is primarily 
focused on replacing human conversation within call centers and facilitating information 
exchange with Alexa and Siri while struggling to make self-driving cars acceptable on the 
freeway; hence, it seems unlikely that an autonomous SkyNet option á la The Terminator 
movie will gain acceptance in the near future. To be clear, that is our main point; although 
there is almost no limitation to what an AI-powered technology could do or perform, 
human thought and culture will still be in the driver’s seat of societal adoption. It is critical 
to accept this fact and focus on the possible solutions available, instead of getting stuck 
investing in the next AI winter. This mindset should help the SOF community hedge 
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against projects that might never be, while taking advantage of opportunities to buy in at a 
low cost when they become available. In short, adhering to the proposed model and these 
recommendations will not in itself produce an AI revolution, but will keep the SOF 
organization agile, ready, and adaptive on the ever-changing battlefield of tomorrow.  
Although there is much debate regarding the implementation of AI in military 
products and solutions, AI is already implemented directly or indirectly in our everyday 
work right now. Working with trustworthy partners to test new ideas and concepts aimed 
at solving present and future challenges is the only way forward for the SOF community. 
As an organization constantly on the edge of development of new skills and tactics, the 
SOF community seems to provide a perfect platform to implement new technology that 
promises increased efficiency and capabilities to front-end users, while pushing the need 
to develop back-end solutions to further the gains made. With little to suggest that society 
will become less reliant on AI implementations in the future, the military needs to accept 
and embrace AI now in order to remain relevant in the future. In the world of AI, it seems, 
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APPENDIX A. HISTORY OF AI 
This literature review aims to provide a historical foundation for understanding the 
possibilities, weaknesses, and potential of AI. The review consists of three parts. First, the 
focus is on the origins and emergence of AI; second, an explanation of the differences 
within AI, machine learning, deep learning, supervised learning, and unsupervised learning 
are explored. Finally, a short explanation on data is provided. 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF AI 
Prof. John Haugeland defines AI as “the idea that thinking and computing are 
radically the same,”228 while Tom Taulli describes AI as, “where computers can learn from 
experience, which often involves processing data using sophisticated algorithms.”229 
When examining AI, it is worth highlighting the differences between humans and 
machines, as this could otherwise be confusing when talking about intelligence. One 
overarching way to compare the differences is presented by the Human Intelligence 
website, shown in the Table 1.230 
 
228 Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, 2. 
229 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 179. 
230 Jean Brown, “Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Human Intelligence” Difference 




Table 1. Human and Artificial Intelligence231.  
 
 
Academia suggests that the first study on AI began in 1955. In the spring of 1956, 
there was a seminar, an early year tech convention, that first introduced AI: the McCarty’s 
Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence. During the convention, the 
three fathers of AI emerged, Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and Herbert Simon.232 They 
assumed that intelligence is the ability to solve problems, and that solving problems is the 
same as finding solutions.  
Both computing and implementations of AI have different explanations within 
academia. Haugland explains in Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, “a computer is an 
interpreted automatic formal system. A formal system can be described as a game in which 
tokens are manipulated according to rules, to see what configurations can be obtained.”233 
To further understand this, it can help to imagine tokens as characters in a game, like chess. 
If a player moves the “king,” the player is only allowed to move him according to 
previously agreed on rules. As pieces are moved around on the board, the situation changes, 
but the rules remain constant, resulting in different configurations. This mind game will 
help the reader to understand how a basic automatic formal system works. 
 
231 Adapted from J. Brown, “Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Human Intelligence.” 
232 Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, 176. 
233 Haugeland, 48. 
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An example of a basic formal system is the calculator; we have agreed upon the 
rule that 1 + 1 = 2. When a calculator user presses the keys 1, + , 1, and finally the key =,  
the configuration of 2 is presented, according to the rules already set and the automated 
answer it produces. It describes a digital system following a formal set of rules, such as a 
computer, and the essence of artificial intelligence.  
The measurement of computational intelligence, explored in one way by academia, 
is the Turing Test. Alan Turing suggested that a philosophical approach to intelligence 
would impose deep discussions on thinking and intelligence. Turing proposed that machine 
intelligence could be tested based on a simple game called the imitation game. The game 
was developed in the 1950s and is now known as the Turing Test.234 The imitation game 
consists of three characters, two witnesses, and one interrogator. With the characters 
separated in space, the interrogator tries to guess which of the witnesses is a machine and 
which is the human. The interrogator only knows the witnesses by the letters X and Y. The 
interrogator can ask a question of the type, “Will X please tell me whether X plays 
chess?”235 The answers are presented on a screen without sound to avoid the problem with 
voices; the machine has achieved intelligence if it can persuade the interrogator to perceive 
the other witness as a machine. Presently, there are other ways of testing machines, but the 
Turing Test is still used to test whether and to what degree a machine can think.236 
However, as Haugeland suggests, the essence is talk; does the machine talk like a human, 
and is the machine perceived as a human in the eyes of an observer? 237 
One could ask if something is intelligent, why not test it with an IQ test? Haugeland 
has a good answer to this: IQ tests test the degree of intelligence on the assumption that it 
has some intelligence to measure. This, Haugland argues, is the issue itself; we must know 
whether it makes sense to attribute intelligence to machines at all before we can ask how 
 
234 Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, 6. 
235 Graham Oppy and David Dowe, “The Turing Test,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2019 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entriesuring-test/.  
236 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 17. 
237 Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, 6. 
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much of it they have.238 We rather need a test that can determine whether a computer is 
intelligent at all, invoking the need for something like the Turing Test. One of the major 
differences between humans and computers is the speed of calculation. A human is capable 
of one calculation per second, while a computer can do one billion calculations per second, 
implying that we can hardly measure intelligence as the rate of calculations over time. 
To summarize, something is artificial if humans make it and it does not occur as a 
result of natural growth. Something is intelligent in the computer realm if it can pass the 
Turing Test (or similar) rather than discussing it from a philosophical view. Artificial 
intelligence is, therefore, something created that can adopt knowledge and pass a test 
deceiving humans. We should, therefore, not misinterpret strict human intelligence and 
behaviors with machines passing the Turing Test. Just because a machine could have 
intelligence and deceive a human in one area does not mean that it is valid over several 
areas or realms.  
B. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ITS SUBFIELDS 
Within AI several subfields exist, and these subfields are graphicly displayed in 
Figure 2, and further explained in the following paragraphs. Figure 2 shows the connections 
and a suggested hierarchy of the different subsets; this capstone focuses on the ones 
described in Figure 2.239 The visualization aims to clarify how different types and subsets 
within AI are connected or interrelated with each other.  
Figure 2. Graphical Overview of AI. 
 
238 Haugeland, 7. 



















1. Machine Learning 
Machine learning (ML) is how a computer can learn without being programmed.240 
ML is an area with several subcategories: supervised learning (SL), unsupervised learning 
(UL), and deep learning (DL), ML is the most well-known part of AI.241  
ML algorithms use statistics or pre-defined images to identify patterns in large 
amounts of data. According to Karen Hao, typically ML encompasses numbers, words, 
images, and other data, which is processed and enabled by many of the services that we 
use today, exemplified by Netflix, YouTube, and Spotify.242 In these services, the aim is 
to give the user a more tailored experience. Within SL, a user will train the network to learn 
a certain input-output function, given a large dataset of examples. The outputs work as 
labels for the inputs, and the network will classify them.243 In SL, the computer trains on 
labeled data. By doing so, the computer will know what pattern to look for.244 UL is 
somewhat the opposite to SL, as the raw data has no markers or tags; the machine searches 
and develops patterns by itself. Some, like Hao, would argue that is why UL is not equally 
popular, and the applications are not obvious.245 The difference between SL and UL is that 
SL uses labeled data, and UL does not.246 
2. Deep Learning 
Deep learning is considered by some scholars as the revolution in AI, as further 
explained in this paragraph. The argument maintains that even for a lot of data, DL can 
find a solution by the algorithms within DL. Taulli explains, “systems … can process huge 
 
240 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 66. 
241 Chaudhary, “Artificial Intelligence.” 
242 Karen Hao, “What Is Machine Learning?,” MIT Technology Review, November 17, 2018, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612437/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-you-another-flowchart/.  
243 Peter Denning, “A Hierarchy of AI Machines” (class notes for CS4000: Harnessing AI, Naval 
Postgraduate School, October 2, 2019). 
244 Hao, “What Is Machine Learning?” 
245 Hao. 
246 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 67. 
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amounts of data to find relationships and patterns that humans are often unable to 
detect.”247 This argument is reinforced by Hao when she states, “it [DL] uses a technique 
that gives machines an enhanced ability to find – and amplify – even the smallest patterns, 
this technique is called deep neural networks.”248 DL sometimes uses artificial neural 
networks; these networks are based more on a human brain and are not logic-based like 
other ML techniques.249 DL is dependent on computational power, and therefore, its rise 
has come somewhat newly. DL sometimes is described as using ML models of multiple 
layers of non-linear processing units.250  
3. Robotic Process Automation 
Robotic Process Automation (RPA) is the possibility for companies to automate 
rule-based processes. Taulli describes RPA when he says “robots do not mean physical 
robots; it is about software-based robots or bots.”251 These bots can replace humans 
performing rule-based tasks; an example of typical tasks can be found in the Deloitte report 
on RPA, such as “opening email and attachments, moving files and folders, filling in forms, 
and reading and writing to databases.”252 RPA is the use of software to ease the burden of 
the human workforce. The aim is to replace “simple” tasks that could be done by machines 
rather than using human resources to do them. Taulli concludes that RPA can lead to major 
savings. RPA is therefore an attractive option for implementing basic AI within a 
community or company. 
 
247 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 71. 
248 Hao, “What Is Machine Learning?” 
249 Selmer Bringsjord and Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu, “Artificial Intelligence,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2019 (Stanford, California: Metaphysics 
Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), 62–74, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/artificial-intelligence/.  
250 Svenmarck et al., “Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military 
Applications.” 
251 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 93. 




To summarize, RPA is a software bot (robot) tool that could enhance effectiveness 
within an organization by replacing human resources assigned to rule-based tasks. 
Achieving efficiency, however, demands proper planning and assessments of the tasks 
performed by humans that can be easily replaced by software bots. 
4. Natural Language Processing 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is an area described by Michael J. Garbade as 
“a branch of artificial intelligence that deals with the interaction between computers and 
humans using the natural language.”253 An interaction between the computer and the 
human client is utilizing NLP. People often encounter NLP in daily situations without 
realizing it is powered by an AI functionality.  Taulli explains this as “the first interaction 
with NLP is with virtual assistants.”254 Virtual assistants have become popular over the 
last couple of years. The technology can, just like RPA, provide substantial savings for a 
company. Insurance companies and customer service interfaces, such as Amazon’s chat 
bot, are examples of this technology and its functionality will likely continue to flourish. 
Taulli continues with the argument that “NLP will become increasingly important for e-
commerce and customer service.”255 Both Garbade and Taulli refer to ML when 
describing NLP; however, not all NLP techniques rely on ML.256  NLP is typically used in 
modern services like Alexa, Cortana, and Siri.257 
5. Physical Robots 
Physical Robots (PR) are, according to Taulli, characterized by four main parts, 
Physical, Act, Sense, and Intelligence. Taulli suggests that the physical aspects of a robot 
 
253 Michael J. Garbade, “A Simple Introduction to Natural Language Processing,” Medium, October 
15, 2018, https://becominghuman.ai/a-simple-introduction-to-natural-language-processing-ea66a1747b32.  
254 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 123. 
255 Taulli, 123. 
256 Taulli, 48; Garbade, “A Simple Introduction to Natural Language Processing.ˮ  
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shape range from massive industrial systems and underwater vessels to flying machines.258 
A robot does not necessarily have to look like the famous Star Wars character R2-D2, but 
it could. When describing the act characteristic, Taulli defines it as the actions a robot can 
perform, including moving items and talking.259 For a robot to act, it must be able to sense 
and understand its environment; thus, it requires sensors and a feedback system. Haugeland 
goes even deeper to describe feelings related a robot. He lists seven kinds of feelings that 
might or might not affect the behavior of robots and AI.260 Finally, a robot needs 
intelligence to be programmed. Robots are an emerging technology within AI and are 
moving more and more towards autonomy; an example of a daily use robot is the Roomba 
vacuum cleaner.261 
To summarize, AI has several subsets with different possibilities and constraints. 
Machine learning is the foundation of modern AI and its subsidiaries; supervised learning, 
unsupervised learning, and deep learning enable other subsets of AI. 
C. DATA EXPLAINED 
Bits describes data, and is short for a binary digit, and described in binary language 
as a one [1] or a zero [0]. When we define amounts of data, the term “bytes” describes the 
size of stored data. Data is in one of three states: in transit, in process, or at rest. Data at 
rest is data stored in a computer’s memory, a hard drive, or a cloud. The opposite is when 
a user works on his or her client (computer), where the data is in process. Data in transit is 
when data is sent between a host and a client; for example, when a user sends an email. 
When examining AI, it is inevitable to mention storage space and the process rate of bits 
and bytes to get a better understanding of the concept, and the speed at which a computer 
conducts computation. In Table 2, the authors have borrowed from Taulli to clarify data 
volumes. 
 
258 Taulli, Artificial Intelligence Basics, 126. 
259 Taulli, 126. 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEWS 
When conducting interviews, the authors chose to use close-ended questions and 
open-ended questions. The function or the aim of close-ended questions is described by 
Lorène Fauvelle as “closed-ended questions are designed and oriented to follow a pattern 
and framework predefined by the interviewer.”263 A close-ended question offers, 
therefore, a limited number of answers, often a simple yes or no.264 The intention is to 
provide the interviewer with a clear and easily measured answer. Although a comparative 
study could be done with the yes and no answers alone where conclusions could be drawn 
and shown on graphs, Fauvelle notes that “an open-ended question is a question that allows 
the respondent to express himself or herself freely on a given subject.”265 It allows the 
interviewer to ask the interviewee to elaborate or explain his or her standpoint on a specific 
subject. Rather than comparing the number of yes and no answers, a researcher can 
compare what specifics within a topic stands out or are similar between different thematic 
areas.  
In this report, the use of open-ended questions as per the SAGE Encyclopedia on 
Qualitative Research Methods is motivated by the following: “Open-ended questions also 
called open, unstructured, or qualitative questions, refer to those questions for which the 
response patterns or answer categories are provided by the respondent, not the 
interviewer.”266 As the researchers’ knowledge of the AI area is not deep enough to allow 
for a comprehensive question bank, open-ended questions allow the range of possible 
answers to exceed what could be provided in a questionnaire.267 
 
263 Lorene Fauvelle, “Qualitative Research: Open-Ended and Closed-Ended Questions,” Market 




266 Kathryn J. Roulston, “Open-Ended Question,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research 
Methods, ed. Lisa M. Given (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), 583, 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412963909.  




The authors chose to interview five individuals from private corporations, scholars 
within the area of AI, and finally, military personnel with user experiences. 
a. Source # 10 
Source #10 is an employee within the commercial sector in Silicon Valley.  
b. Source # 20 
Source #20 works within an organization close to the U.S. SOCOM that helps 
develop and leverage new technologies. 
c. Source # 30 
Source #30 works within a defense support organization in Silicon Valley.  
d. Source # 40 
Source #40 is the CEO of an A.I. company that delivers easy-to-use front end A.I. 
solutions.  
e. Source # 50 




B. QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS 
Since our framework for this research is transparency, security, and data, these 
words frame some of the questions. The questions build upon the following main 
categories, justification, experience, presence, security, transparency, data, procurement, 
and future application. There are two sets of questions, one that focuses on the individual 
and the individual’s opinions. The other set of questions focuses on the organizational 
perspective and a corporate viewpoint. The interviewee was contacted beforehand and had 
the option to answer from a regulatory/organizational perspective or a personal perspective. 
The interview questions, along with the rationale for asking the question and its 
category for coding, are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Interview Questions 
 
# Individual Opinion Motive Coding 
1.1 What qualifies you to answer 
questions on AI? 
It is an essential 
question because it 
will help us as 
researchers to justify 
the answers of the 
interviewee. 
Background 
1.2 How would you define AI? Will help us when 
coding the response. 
 
1.3 How did you come in contact with 
AI? 
  
1.4 Do you or your organization 
currently use AI? 
  
1.5 If yes, how and in what ways, 
means, or types do you and your 
organization utilize AI? 
  
2.1 What do you consider to be AI? Different individuals 
and organizations 
have diverse 
definitions of AI. 
Framing 
2.2 What is NOT AI? It is sometimes easier 




something is not 
instead of what it is. 
2.3 Within AI, which of the subsets are 
most common or familiar? 
Help validate answers 
on the application and 
transparency of AI. 
 
2.4 From your point of view, what are 
the three most important drivers of 
AI? 
It will give us a 
direction of potential 
biases in the later 
answers. 
 
2.5 What are the possible adverse 
outcomes with AI? 
Could give a hint on 
moral and ethical 
perspectives. 
 
2.6 When acquiring AI, was it a quick 
fix or a long-term implementation? 
It is interesting 
because, often SOF 
has a different 
acquisition track, 
which leads to faster 
shopping. 
Timeframe 
2.7 Depending on the answer, 
successful or not? 
  
2.8 After how long did your 
organization have an impact on the 
acquired AI system? 
Interesting to compare 
acquisition times with 
effectiveness. 
 
3.1 How would you describe 
transparency in procurement or 
acquisition? 







3.2 Did your organization acquire AI 
because of need or because of an 
introduction to a product or 
solution? 
  
3.3 When acquiring AI, what should 
one question? 
This question will 
give guidance on the 
mindset of acquisition. 
 
3.4 When acquiring AI, give us your 
thoughts on what an enterprise 
should consider? 
See above.  
3.5 Do you think it is vital to get 
access to the source code of an 
algorithm when acquiring AI, 
please develop your answer? 
See above. It will also 
tell the willingness to 





3.6 What infrastructural considerations 
have you discovered when 
acquiring AI? 




3.7 Has infrastructure inflicted any 
limitations on your procurement or 
the acquiring process? 
Plan ahead.  
3.8 Has the lack of infrastructure made 
you or your organization turn down 
an AI product? 
Why didn’t or did the 
organization buy a 
product. 
 
3.9 Have you made organizational 
changes? 
Have the personnel 
been replaced by 
machines or have 
human resources been 
able to focus on other 
areas? 
 
4.1  What is security, and is it 
important? 
How does the person 
define security? Will 
help us to get the 
context of the answers 
on the security 
questions. 
Security 
4.2 From your point of view, describe 
possible security issues when 
acquiring and implementing AI? 
It will give examples 
of security flaws. 
 
4.3 How can these possible security 
issues be mitigated? 
See above.  
4.4 Have you heard of, or have you 
experienced any security flaws 
directly connect to the 





5.1 When discussing AI, talking data is 
essential: what is data? 




5.2  What does the availability of data 
mean to you? 
Will give the 
perspective on data 
and AI. 
 
5.3 Is it essential to define what data 
one possesses before acquiring AI? 
It will provide us with 
a hint on the focus 
area of AI. 
 
5.4 Are there specific areas within AI 
that address data? 
Data in transit or 
process. Data at rest, 
or is data just what’s 
being observed by a 





5.5 If data is not essential to AI, what 
is? 
A more philosophical 
angle. 
 
6.1 What can we expect from AI in the 
future? 
A prediction of future 
application. 
Future 
6.2 What will we NOT see from AI in 
the future? 
Interesting to get the 
person’s angle. 
 
6.3 What ethical considerations did 
you or your organization have? 
Ethical discussions are 
vast when it comes to 
AI. Therefore, the 
position on this 
subject is interesting. 
Ethics 
6.4 Do you or your organization have 
an ethical framework for AI and its 
utilization? 
  
6.5 Would there be ethical decisions 
that prevent your organization from 
buying an AI system? 
  
6.6 How did you implement the ethical 
discussion, the framework into 
your organization? 
  
7.1 Have you evaluated the 
effectiveness of your AI system? 
 Measure of effect 
7.2 How were you able to evaluate 
this? 
  
7.3 Has AI affected your overall 
budget? 
The answer can be 
diverse; yes, in the 
short term, it has been 
costly, but we think 
we will have a return 
on an investment after 
x years. 
 
8.1 What, from your perspective, are 
the three main vital takeaways we 
should consider when we continue 
our pursuit of solving our 
capstone?  
A chance to stress 
what’s essential for 
the individual. 
Key points 
8.2 Any final considerations and 
anything you would like to remove, 
change, or add? 
The last chance to 
change or take back 






# Organizational Perspective Motive Coding 
 
91 
1.1a What qualifies your position 
within the organization to 
answer questions on AI? 
It is an essential 
question because it 
will help us as 
researchers to justify 
the answers of the 
interviewee. 
Background 
1.2a How would your organization 
define AI? 
Will help us when 
coding the response. 
 
1.3a How did your organization 
come in contact with AI? 
  
1.4a Does your organization 
currently use AI? 
  
1.5a If yes, how and in what ways, 
means, or types does your 
organization utilize AI? 
  
2.1b What does your organization 
consider to be AI? 
Different 
organizations have 
diverse definitions of 
AI. 
Framing 
2.2b What is NOT AI? It is sometimes 
easier to describe 
what something is 
not instead of what it 
is. 
 
2.3b Within AI, which of the subsets 
are most common or familiar, 
according to your organization? 
Help validate 
answers on the 
application and 
transparency of AI. 
 
2.4b From your organizational point 
of view, what are the three 
most important drivers of AI? 
It will give us a 
direction of potential 
biases in the later 
answers. 
 
2.5b What are the possible adverse 
outcomes with AI? 
Could give a hint on 
moral and ethical 
perspectives. 
 
2.6b When your organization 
acquired AI, was it a quick fix 
or a long-term implementation 
from an organizational point of 
view? 
It is interesting 
because often SOF 
has a different 
acquisition track, 
which leads to faster 
shopping. 
Timeframe 
2.7b Depending on the answer, 




2.8b After how long did your 
organization have an impact on 






3.1c How would your organization 
describe transparency in 
procurement or acquisition? 







3.2c Did your organization acquire 
AI because of need or because 
of an introduction to a product 
or solution? 
  
3.3c When purchasing AI, what 
should one question according 
to your organization? 
This question will 




3.4c When acquiring AI, give us 
your organization’s thoughts on 
what an enterprise should 
consider? 
See above.  
3.5c Does your organization think it 
is vital to get access to the 
source code of an algorithm 
when acquiring AI, and please 
develop the answer? 
See above. It will 
also tell the 
willingness to 
question or present – 
Transparency. 
 
3.6c What infrastructural 
considerations has your 
organization discovered when 
acquiring AI? 
Is it a demanding 
infrastructural 
project or not? 
Infrastructure 
3.7c Has infrastructure inflicted any 
limitations on your 
procurement or the acquiring 
process? 
Plan ahead.  
3.8c Has the lack of infrastructure 
made your organization turn 
down an AI product? 
Why didn’t or did 
the organization buy 
a product. 
 
3.9c Has your org. made 
organizational changes? 
Have the personnel 
been replaced by 
machines or have 
human resources 





4.1 d What is security, and how is it 
essential to your organization? 
How does the person 
define security? Will 
help us to get the 
context of the 
answers on the 
security questions. 
Security 
4.2d From your organization’s point 
of view, describe possible 
security issues when acquiring 
and implementing AI? 
It will give examples 
of security flaws. 
 
4.3d How can these possible 
security issues be mitigated 
according to your organization? 
See above.  
4.4d Has your organization heard of, 
or has it experienced any 
security flaws directly connect 





5.1e When discussing AI, talking 
data is essential: what is data 
according to your organization? 




5.2 e What does the availability of 
data mean to your 
organization? 
Will give the 
perspective on data 
and AI. 
 
5.3e Is it essential to define what 
data one possesses before 
acquiring AI into an 
organization? 
It will provide us 
with a hint on the 
focus area of AI. 
 
5.4e Are there specific areas within 
AI that address data? 
Data in transit or 
process. Data at rest, 
or is data just what’s 
being observed by a 
UAV that is using AI 
to navigate? 
 





6.1f What can we expect from AI in 
the future, according to your 
organization? 
A prediction of 
future application. 
Future 
6.2f What will we NOT see from AI 
in the future, according to your 
organization? 
Interesting to get the 
person’s angle. 
 
6.3f What ethical considerations did 
your organization have? 
Ethical discussions 
are vast when it 





position on this 
subject is interesting. 
6.4f Does your organization have an 
ethical framework for AI and 
its utilization? 
  
6.5f Would there be ethical 
decisions that prevent your 
organization from buying an AI 
system? 
  
6.6f How did your organization 
implement the ethical 
discussion, the framework into 
your organization? 
  
7.1g Has your organization 
evaluated the effectiveness of 
your AI system? 
 Measure of effect 
7.2g How was your organization 
able to evaluate this? 
  
7.3g Has AI affected your 
organization’s overall budget? 
The answer can be 
diverse; yes, in the 
short term, it has 
been costly, but we 
think we will have a 
return on an 
investment after x 
years. 
 
8.1h What, from your organization’s 
perspective, are the three main 
vital takeaways we should 
consider when we continue our 
pursuit of solving our 
capstone?  
A chance to stress 
what’s essential for 
the individual. 
Key points 
8.2h Any final considerations and 
anything your organization 
would like to remove, change, 
or add? 
The last chance to 
change or take back 









SUPPLEMENTALS: QUICK REVIEW AND ANIMATION 
A. CAPSTONE QUICK REVIEW  
The supplemental briefly describes major findings of the research and potential 
applications for the model discussed in the main body of the capstone report and is 
presented in a more accessible format. The supplement uses parts of the main body text 
and is intended for presentational use only. Access to the report is possible either via link 
available within the main thesis catalog entry in the NPS Institutional Archive, Calhoun, 
or by contacting the NPS library. 
B. SHORT ANIMATION AND INTRODUCTION 
A short animation in Doodley depicts the research results as three guidelines. The 
guidelines aim to help an organization interested in acquiring AI and serves to nurture 
interest in the research report/capstone. It is intended for presentational use only via social 
media. The animation refers to the capstone report. Access to the animation is possible 
either via link available within the main thesis catalog entry in the NPS Institutional 
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